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Internetmeemeistä on tullut suosittu viestinnän muoto eri sosiaalisen median kanavissa. Nettimeemit ovat 
tunteenomaista ja luovaa viestintää, jolla voidaan osallistua julkiseen keskusteluun, esittää poliittisia mielipiteitä tai 
yksinkertaisesti kommentoida kanssakeskustelijoiden viestejä humoristisella ja visuaalisella tavalla.  
 
Tässä tutkielmassa tarkastellaan internetmeemejä poliittisen kommunikaation näkökulmasta. Tutkielmassani 
kiinnitän erityistä huomiota siihen, miten internetin meemikuvasto heijastelee populismintutkimuksen teoreettisessa 
keskustelussa esiin nousseita ajatuksia. Samalla pyrin osallistumaan keskusteluun siitä, miten populismia 
kommunikoidaan sosiaalisessa mediassa ruohonjuuritasolla. Tutkielmassani yhdistelen kahta teoreettista 
näkökulmaa populismista: Ernesto Laclaun teoriaa populismista artikulaation logiikkana sekä Benjamin Moffittin 
teoriaa populismista poliittisena tyylinä. Tavoitteenani on löytää näkökulma, jonka avulla pystytään analysoimaan 
merkitysten rakentumista sekä kielellisesti että visuaalisesti, mikä on erityisen tärkeää eri elementtejä yhdistelevien 
meemien tutkimuksessa.  
 
Testatakseni teoreettisessa osassa tekemiäni hahmotelmia, otan tarkasteluun espanjalaisessa sosiaalisessa 
mediassa leviäviä meemikuvia. Aineisto koostuu meemikuvista, jotka joko esittävät tai kommentoivat Espanjan 
entistä pääministeriä Mariano Rajoyta. Rajoy-meemikuvat valikoituivat aineistoksi, koska hänestä oli 
pääministerikausiensa saatossa tullut espanjalaisessa nettiyhteisössä leviävä sisäpiirivitsi. Espanjan poliittista 
tilannetta Rajoyn kausien aikana värittivät useat uudet populistiset puolueet ja liikkeet, joiden kritiikki kohdistui 
Rajoyn hallintoon sekä laajemmin poliittiseen eliittiin. Tämä heijastui vahvasti myös internetin Rajoyta kritisoivaan 
meemikuvastoon, joiden suosituimmat teemat (talouskuripolitiikka ja korruptio) vastasivat populististen liikkeiden 
pääteemoja. Teemoittelinkin aineistoni näiden kritiikinaiheiden mukaisiin kategorioihin, jotka vastaavat tutkielman 
neljättä ja viidettä päälukua. Tämän lisäksi kolmannessa luvussa käsittelen meemihuumoria, jonka kohteena ei 
niinkään ole Rajoyn politiikan sisältö vaan pikemminkin hänen persoonaansa ja olemukseensa liittyvät asiat.   
 
Tutkielman käsitteluvuissa kuvailen esimerkkien avulla millaisia näkemyksiä meemikuvat tekivät Rajoysta ja pyrin 
tulkitsemaan ja ymmärtämään niitä populismia käsittelevän teoreettisen kirjallisuuden kautta. Espanjalaiset 
meemikuvat levittivät erilaisia Rajoyta koskevia näkemyksiä, jotka osaltaan edesauttoivat populistisen kollektiivisen 
identiteetin muodostumista. Niiden avulla luotiin yhteyksiä toisistaan irrallisten poliittisten vaatimusten välille, 
kuvaamalla niitä yhtenäisenä rintamana Rajoyn edustamaa poliittista eliittiä vastaan. Ne myös korostivat vallitsevan 
yhteiskunnallisen järjestelmän kykenemättömyyttä vastata kansalaisten tarpeisiin. Meemikritiikin pohjavireenä 
vaikutti olevan vaatimus vallan palauttamisesta korruptoituneilta poliitikoilta kansalaisten käsiin.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Political Internet Memes  
You may think they are witty. You may see them as mindless, childish humor. One thing is sure, 
anyone who has spent at least some time in social media, has been exposed to them. Internet users 
have grown accustomed to meme images, GIF-files and videos that are being created, circulated 
and transformed in social media. Among other participatory phenomena, internet memes have 
become vastly popular among users, who do not act as mere spectators, but actively participate in 
editing and spreading these items around the web. This, often humorous, “cultural jamming” 
might, however, possess a more serious agenda than mere diversion and entertainment. The 
purpose of this study is to examine how internet memes are used as a form of political, and 
especially, populist communication. I also look to provide insights for the theoretical discussion 
on the relation between populism and social media. To further elaborate the theoretical discussion, 
I will draw examples from material consisting of meme images about the former Spanish Prime 
Minister1 Mariano Rajoy.  
The meme as a concept has its roots in the time before internet became the prevalent system it is 
today. The word meme was coined by biologist Richard Dawkins. Dawkins understood memes as 
ideas and other cultural units that are spread in human interaction by imitation and copying.2 In an 
online environment, the concept of meme has incorporated new meanings, and various academic 
definitions for internet memes have been developed. Communication scholar Limor Shifman 
suggests internet memes should be understood as “pieces of cultural information that pass along 
from person to person, but gradually scale into a shared social phenomenon”. Shifman specifies 
that a group of digital items form an internet meme if they contain common characteristics, were 
created with awareness of each other and are then being imitated, spread and remixed via internet.3 
Thus, following Shifman’s idea, a single image cannot be described as meme in its own right, but 
rather it forms part of a group of remixes that make up a meme. In other words, a single image is 
just one remix in a group of images (or other formats) that form a meme. In order to avoid 
confusion, when referring to single images, I will use the term meme image. As this study focuses 
 
1 Officially in Spanish Presidente del Gobierno, President of the Government, but his duties roughly coincide with 
the ones of most European Prime Ministers. I will be using the title “Prime Minister” in this study.  
2 Dawkins 1976, 192–194.  
3 Shifman 2014, 18, 41.  
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on single meme images, we can start by considering meme image to be a multimodal cultural 
artefact where image is often combined with text in order to tell a joke, make on observation or 
advance an argument.4 
Digital media expert Graham Meikle points out that memes can practically surge out of any image, 
piece of text, video or phenomenon. It is often a seemingly random image of an ordinary person 
or an animal, whose expression or gesture adopts a specific meaning in the online community and 
evolves into a meme. Internet memes can also be based on offline popular culture figures, such as 
movie or video game characters. Memes are a prime example of online remix culture that 
encourages users to create their own versions of content created and adapted by others. A Meme 
itself, without any additional texts or editing, contains meanings recognizable for internet users 
and can serve as a response to a message as such. Every meme has its own rules and logic, for 
instance a way of writing with specific typing errors.5  
Internet memes can be described as inside jokes of the online community and are sometimes 
incomprehensible for those who do not belong to the internet culture that shares the same system 
of meanings. Those who do not understand this shared system of meanings become a reference 
group, an out-group, from which this in-group of internet culture looks to differentiate itself. 
Memes can function as important performative acts of collective identification and differentiation.6 
As Shifman suggests, internet memes can be considered postmodern folklore of the online 
community, in which shared values and norms are constructed through inside jokes and online 
legends. For Shifman, the meme culture epitomizes the very essence of the Web 2.0 era.7 
Meme image has become a relevant medium for political communication in the current hybrid 
media system, where memes can provide a mean for citizens to respond to political events in real 
time without fear of censorship.8 Internet mediated communication has made means for political 
participation more accessible and horizontal, increased interaction between different actors and 
facilitated the mobilization of political movements.9 Meanwhile, the role of the traditional news 
media (press, TV and radio) as gatekeepers of political information seems to be diminishing. 
 
4 Milner 2012, 10.  
5 Meikle 2018, 47–56.  
6 Pearce 2015; Gal, Shifman & Kampf 2016.  
7 Shifman 2014, 15.  
8 Ross & Rivers 2017.  
9 Hatakka 2019, 11, 54.   
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Chadwick has emphasized the hybridity and contingency of the current media system, which is 
built upon interactions between the logics of the older and newer media. Power in this hybrid 
media system is fragmented and is exercised by those who are successful in producing, reframing, 
reconfiguring and steering the flows of politically relevant information in a way that it advances 
their goals and simultaneously modifies, enables and disables the agency of others.10  
Political meme images work in smooth ways in the current hybrid media system, as they can 
reiterate or reframe, emphasize or downplay the importance and exposure of certain news stories 
reported by the traditional media or raise awareness about some social issues that that were left 
with little or no publicity. This also reflects the dynamics of the hybrid media system as the 
political meme imagery is in constant interaction with the political communication of the older 
media. Niko Hatakka argues that online countercultures can appropriate pieces of journalism to 
support their own agenda by selective sharing of confirmatory stories and ideological 
reconfiguring of dissonant stories. He argues that it is important to analyze how journalistic content 
is used in online environment to advance certain agendas.11 As I aim to demonstrate in this study, 
political meme images often take issues mediated by traditional news media and continue the 
conversation in their own way in order to reframe the issue to pursue political goals and/or simply 
a good laugh.   
Memes propagate certain understandings of social realities, which can have subversive features 
that counter the existing hegemony or, on the contrary, sometimes reinforce the values of those in 
power. Memes discuss, re-mediate and reframe current social issues in a humorous way, which 
has proved to be a spreadable strategy online. They are often characterized by satire, which allows 
them to bring up serious issues while maintaining a disguise of being only entertainment. Scholars 
have recognized also a more general trend towards comedic coverage of politics.12 
Studying internet memes can help us understand how political communication works in the current 
hybrid media system that consists of information flow between the old media and the user-
generated online social media. In order for internet to become truly social, a shift needed to occur 
from the so-called Web 1.0, which was, for the most part, a static platform that worked as a source 
 
10 Chadwick 2017, 4, 285.  
11 Hatakka 2019, 18–19.  
12 Highfield 2016, 46.  
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of information, and where most users acted simply as consumers. The Time chose “you” as the 
person of the year in 2006, due to the new user-based participatory practices made possible by 
Web 2.0 communication technologies,13 and since then, the online participatory culture has 
swelled and flourished. Web 2.0 was not a specific update or technological element introduced in 
any particular moment, but rather a gradual transition in webpage design and usage, that happened 
in the turn of the 21st century and enabled user-generated content creation and participatory 
culture. 
Web 2.0 has made it possible for political content – shared news articles, video clips or meme 
images to spread from person to person quickly. Additionally, people tend to find information 
provided by their peers more trustworthy than the information received directly from professional 
media outlets. Hence, online political participation capitalizes on the power of interpersonal 
persuasion and reach of the online social networks.14 Spaniards seem particularly active in online 
participation. According to Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019, 52 per cent of Spaniards 
reported sharing news stories in social media or email, which gives them the highest participation 
index among EU-countries.15 Additionally, based on my observations, I argue that Spanish internet 
users are also eminently active in sharing political internet memes.  
1.2 Spanish Political Deadlock and Internet Activism 
This study will focus on the meme images in the Spanish political context and especially on the 
images treating Spain’s conservative People’s Party16 and its ex-leader, and former Prime Minister 
Mariano Rajoy (in office 2011-2018). Rajoy and his political (and non-political) actions have been 
constantly commented by using meme images of the internet. Some photos of Rajoy have evolved 
into memes themselves and have been re-mixed and used to comment on Rajoy or even some 
unconnected issues. According to a quantitative analysis conducted on Twitter, memes have 
targeted Rajoy more than any other politician in Spain.17  
Rajoy was forced to resign as Prime Minister after a vote of no-confidence in the Congress of 
Deputies. A motion of no-confidence was filed by the socialist party leader Pedro Sánchez after a 
 
13 Grossman, Time 25.12.2006.  
14 Weeks et al. 2015, 216-217.  
15 Reuters Institute 2019.  
16 Partido Popular, PP.  
17 master_datos, Infolibre 2.1.2017  
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court ruling of corruption cases of the PP was published. The ruling stated that there was a network 
of institutionalized corruption and that the People’s Party had a slush fund at least from 1990 to 
2009.18 One of the main topics of the meme critique towards the People’s Party has been 
corruption, which finally was the reason why Rajoy had to step down from politics after 40 years.  
In the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis, Spain has drifted into a political crossroads. 
Neoliberalization and alteration between center-left and center-right parties, revolving doors 
between administration and corporations, robust corruption, increasing irresponsiveness of 
political elites to social demands, rising disaffection of popular majorities with representative 
democracy and demobilization of citizens have been some of the negative elements in the Spanish 
political sphere since the arguably successful transition to democracy.19 The 2011 protests of the 
Indignados20 movement can be seen as a watershed, which has brought about profound changes in 
the Spanish political culture. The two-party system has been broken down by newcomers; left-
wing populist party Podemos, center-right Ciudadanos and also very recently a far-right party Vox 
have managed to challenge the duopoly of the People’s Party and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ 
Party21. The situation has created tensions and problems to form coalitions and build consensus in 
a traditionally majoritarian democracy system, which resulted in various snap elections and more 
than 300 days without government during 2015-2016.22 In the beginning of 2020, the first coalition 
government since 1930’s was sworn. 
Political memes and internet activism in general, have undeniably gained a major importance in 
the Spanish political discussion. Spanish scholars have argued that this has fragmented the Spanish 
political discussion. The plurality of the internet as a political arena has caused a loss of relevance 
of the traditional actors (PP, PSOE and mainstream media) against the citizen-based movements 
and user-generated content.23 The demonstrations of the Indignados or 15-M movement,24 made 
somewhere between six and eight million people take the streets and squares in some 60 Spanish 
 
18 Recuero, El Mundo 25.5.2018. 
19 Kioupkiolis 2016.  
20 “The Indignant ones” 
21 Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE.  
22 Garea, El País 14.10.2016.  
23 Martínez-Rolán & Piñeiro-Otero 2016, 158.  
24 The name comes from the date of the event, 15th of May. This naming format is typical for Spanish political 
events. The demonstrators protested mainly against the economic crisis, cuts in the welfare system, the power of the 
economic elites and the two-party system. 
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cities in 2011. These protests were largely organized on the internet and social media. While 
eschewing clear ideological inclinations, different grievances of the Spaniards were manifested 
simultaneously under a collective identity of the Indignados.25  
Sociologist Manuel Castells has studied the Indignados Movement along with Arab Spring and 
Occupy Movement. He observes that since the institutionally designated space for political 
deliberation is occupied by the networks and interests of the elites, grassroots social movements 
need to seek new spaces for networked communication in order to construct new political 
imaginaries. According to Castells, these movements were born in the new online social networks 
and the participants spread images, content and ideas mainly through these technologies.26 15-M 
demonstrations were triggered through social media campaigns that encouraged people to take 
their protest to the streets with slogans such as “Toma la calle”27 and “La revolución empieza el 
15 de Mayo”28.29 Scholars have argued that internet memes played a significant role in the 
development of the Occupy Movement30 and it seems clear that they have contributed greatly in 
mobilizing citizens in the Spanish context as well.31  
The populist left party Podemos, which was founded in 2014, looked to carry the demands of the 
Indignados to Spanish institutional politics and its successful breakthrough can partly be explained 
by its strong and organic links to the movement.32 Calvo and Alvarez have argued that Podemos 
does not equal Indignados, as inside the latter many opposed participating in institutional politics 
in their contemporary form (including abstaining from voting). The ideological similarities, 
however, are striking and Indignados participants with previous experience in politics were more 
likely to subscribe to Podemos’ cause.33 Podemos has entered in electoral alliances with several 
smaller left-wing parties (most importantly Izquierda Unida and Equo) under varying names 
(Unidos Podemos and Unidas Podemos), but in this study I will refer to these alliances as Podemos. 
 
25 Gerbaudo 2012, 76–101.  
26 Castells 2012, 10.  
27 “Take the streets” 
28 ” The Revolution starts on May 15th.”  
29 Gerbaudo 2012, 87–88.  
30 Meikle 2016 143; Milner 2012, 212–285.  
31 Gerbaudo 2012. 
32 Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis 2019.  
33 Calvo & Alvarez 2015.  
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As the mobilization of the Indignados demonstrates, Spanish grassroots activists seem to have 
understood the importance of the social media in advancing their political goals.34 The political 
parties have also increasingly moved their activity towards the internet. Karen Sanders has studied 
the online presence of Podemos and discovered that due to its active role in political discussions 
on different social media, the party managed to contact those who had not previously voted. 
Therefore, in 2014 European elections it won a significant number of votes from people who had 
previously abstained or those who voted for the first time.35 As populism researcher Benjamin 
Moffitt concludes, populist leaders and parties now have an additional stage for their performance 
and are now in lesser degree dependent on traditional news media. Many populists frame this as 
circumventing the biased establishment media and addressing “the people” directly.36 In Spain, 
Podemos has utilized online referendums as a tool to involve its members in decision-making, but 
as Paolo Gerbaudo concludes, these referendums have been more like rubber-stamp elections than 
genuine deliberation between competing options among party members.37  
Before the vote of no-confidence that displaced Rajoy, the People’s Party had also noticed the 
effective deployment of this new media in unwanted political activity. Internet memes became a 
topic of national discussion when the People’s Party’s Parliamentary group announced in an 
official bulletin of the Parliament their plans to update the legislation in order to secure the dignity 
of the citizens in the era of new communication technologies. The bulletin also mentions the 
images that are uploaded to the internet without the consent of title holders as an example of 
possible violations of personal honor.38  
Many interpreted this proposition as an intention to start controlling offensive mockery that 
Spanish politicians have had to withstand on the internet, particularly in the form of political 
memes. The civil society group “Platform for the Defence of Free Expression” has described the 
proposition as a definite threat to the freedom of expression and also unnecessary, because the 
existing law39 is already ample enough to contemplate possible violations on the net.40 The alleged 
 
34 For example, Spanish social media page United Unknown describes itself as visual guerrilla that creates videos 
and satirical images 
35 Sanders 2016, 47–48.  
36 Moffitt 2016, 88.  
37 Gerbaudo 2019.  
38 Congreso de los Diputados, 3.11.2016. 
39 La Ley Orgánica de Protección del Derecho al Honor y a la Intimidad Personal 1/1982. 
40 La Plataforma en Defensa de la Libertad de Información, 7.11.2016.  
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crusade of the People’s Party against the memes also gave impetus to a rampant reaction on the 
internet, as netizens rebelliously uploaded memes to Twitter, Facebook and other social media, 
hypothesizing their future illicitness, with a hashtag #SinMemesNoHayDemocracia, without 
memes there is no democracy. The traditional media also reacted strongly to this initiative. The 
leaders of the People’s Party have been short-spoken about this proposition in the media. Teodoro 
García, nowadays secretary-general of the party, commented that their intention was not to prohibit 
all memes, but to avoid the circulation of material, that may harm citizens.41 Perhaps due to fierce 
opposition towards the proposition, no bills were proposed to restrict the freedom of expression 
online.  
During the People’s Party’s government in 2015, the Senate approved a controversial security law 
that limited the freedom of assembly and expression, and was later widely criticized internationally 
by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.42 Another 
incident with the political humor of the internet occurred, when in January 2017 a 21-year-old 
Spaniard was reported to face charges for publishing jokes on Twitter about the former Franco-era 
Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco, who was assassinated by the Basque nationalist terrorist 
group ETA in 1973. The twitter user was sentenced for one year in prison for humiliation of the 
victims of terrorism.43 However, in 2018 the supreme court annulled the decision made by the 
national court.44 
The reaction to the internet mockery by the People’s Party’s Parliamentary group raises questions 
about political memes and their role in political communication. Is this new form of political humor 
particularly efficient in contemporary information societies? This study will examine the content 
of several political meme images about the former Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, and search for 
answers to the following questions: What kind of strategies do political memes use in their 
activism? How is populism communicated in the online meme imagery? How is Rajoy 
depicted in the meme images? What kind of understandings of social realities are propagated 
in these images?  
 
41 ABC, 8.11.2016.  
42 Kassam, The Guardian 12.3.2015; Minder, The New York Times 30.6.2015. 
43 Pérez, El País 30.3.2017.  
44 Pérez, El País 2.3.2018.  
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1.3 Memes and Political Meaning-Making 
As we stumble upon these internet jokes when scrolling our favorite social media site, for most of 
us they do not come across as effective political influencing. Rather we see them as something that 
gives us a quick laugh, perhaps an urge to share it with our friends and forget about it within the 
next ten minutes. I argue that the social significance of these internet phenomena is much greater 
than it initially appears at a superficial level. I see political meme images playing an important role 
in the meaning-making processes encompassed within the political sphere. 
I start with the basic assumption of meaning being socially constructed. As theorized early on by 
Raymond Williams by using the concept of culture45, and later by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe (Essex School) by the concept of discourse46, the material world itself exists outside 
culture/discourse, but it is this signifying system or systematic set of relations that makes the world 
to mean.47 Cultural theorist Stuart Hall has theorized these processes of meaning-production, 
which he calls representations. He sees that meaning is socially constructed in and through 
signifying systems48 and that, the meanings of different objects are never fixed but rather changing 
and slipping. Hall sees that meaning-making is, in any imaginable situation, inseparable from 
power as “meanings regulate and organize our conduct and practices – they help to set the rules, 
norms and conventions by which social life is ordered and governed”.49  
The above-mentioned thinkers were greatly influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s ideas of cultural 
hegemony. Gramsci suggested that the elites (bourgeoisie) manage to maintain their power not 
only through coercion, but also, and most importantly through ideology, that is propagated through 
culture. The Hegemonic culture maintains the status quo by presenting values and norms that are 
then accepted by the people as common sense. By manipulating common sense through culture, 
the elites manage to provide legitimacy for their own actions and position in power.50 However, in 
this struggle, there are always counter-hegemonic discourses that are trying to subvert the 
hegemonic worldview, win over agents and groups to certain political positions and dismantle the 
 
45 Williams 1961, 36, 54.  
46 Laclau & Mouffe 1990, 100–103.  
47 Williams uses the concept of culture in a very similar way as Laclau and Mouffe use the concept of discourse; see 
also Storey 2010.  
48 Hall uses the term language but understands it as something that goes way beyond just spoken or written 
language.  
49 Hall 1997, 28, 62, 4.  
50 Gramsci 1971, 55–61; Mouffe 2014, 178–192. 
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legitimacy of the elite.51 By applying the ideas of Williams, Laclau, Mouffe and Hall, one can 
arrive at the conclusion that this struggle is ultimately over meaning. The hegemonic status quo 
requires a set of meanings, which constantly reinforces it and holds it in place. Therefore, by 
participating in the struggle to control meaning and by converting meanings to serve their own 
interests, subaltern groups can provide resistance to the hegemonic signifying system and perhaps 
construct one of their own that can overthrow it. Political memes become players in this struggle 
by shaping, constructing and attaching certain meanings to social issues, political occurrences, 
concepts or persons they are depicting. Popular culture artefacts outline and frame their own 
versions of the surrounding realities and consequently affect our perceptions. In democratic 
settings, this will eventually affect the decision-making and political outcomes.  
The Essex School of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe reinterpreted Gramsci’s ideas and 
provided a useful theoretical framework that can help us to understand how (memetic) meaning-
making practices shape how we view the world. In their anti-essentialist theory, the whole cultural 
field is understood as discursive and objects only take on meaning within discourse.52 This 
emphasizes how every social configuration is meaningful.53 The social in this sense is never 
complete, but always under an ongoing process of construction and nothing regarding the social is 
natural or essential. This incompletion enables the emergence of new subjects, multiplicity of 
power centres within the social and possibility of change and therefore of political freedom. For 
Laclau and Mouffe, politics work upon social, and political practice constructs interests, rather 
than merely represents them.54  
Laclau and Mouffe reject the reductionist, class-centered understanding of society, an ontology, 
which was strongly present in the classical Marxist theory, and of which, signs can be seen also in 
the writings of Gramsci. Laclau and Mouffe witnessed various different struggles, such as those 
of  feminism, anti-war, anti-racism and environmentalism, which could not be reduced to a struggle 
between classes. Hence, they concluded that seeing politics as class struggle is simply one of many 
possible ways to understand politics. Other forms of subjectivity may come about when at a 
particular historical moment different elements come together in order to form the identities to our 
 
51 Howarth 2004, 258; Mouffe 2014, 190. 
52 Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 108.  
53 Laclau & Mouffe 1990, 100-103.  
54 Laclau& Mouffe 2001, 134–138, xvii; Williams 2019, 115–122.  
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political struggles.55 Political identities are formed and transformed through contingent 
articulations rather than determined by economic or structural factors.56 With articulation, Laclau 
and Mouffe refer to social signifying acts, where elements are discursively connected with each 
other. This connection can unify different elements in certain conjunctures and conditions, but 
their linkage is not necessary, determined or essential and can be broken.57  
The concept of hegemony from this standpoint relates to the practice of generating “chains of 
equivalence” between subjects with different struggles and demands. The creation of chains of 
equivalence happens by articulating together differential social demands by reference to something 
they collectively oppose or are in antagonistic relation with. In other words, due to the social 
complexity of the social sphere, it has become crucial for those willing to achieve social change to 
create a story that would build links and articulate different ideas, demands and objectives under 
one umbrella.58 Internet memes can serve in many different functions in this discursive politicized 
struggle. Meme interactions can articulate some elements together and carve frontiers between 
others and by doing so, affect what elements end up constituting our political identities. 
This politicized struggle increasingly takes place on the internet. Due to their access to a more 
inclusive political communication, the citizens are not mere consumers, but also producers and 
interpreters of political content. The online participatory cultures have shifted the media 
consumption from traditional top-down model to something far more dynamic and horizontal. As 
nowadays (at least in the Global North), all you need for active political participation is a 
smartphone, the mobilization and organization of social movements has become considerably 
easier and less expensive.59 Consequently, many grassroots movements today seem to believe that 
it is through discursive power and cultural change, rather than the ballot box or other institutional 
forms of politics, where they can pressure the governments and pursue change most effectively. 
Jenkins emphasizes the role of participatory politics (political and civic participation promoted 
through online participatory cultural mechanisms) over participation through established political 
institutions. This is where citizens feel empowered to express their political concerns and can 
reinforce or question and deconstruct the hegemonic understandings of social realities that shape 
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how culture and politics work.60 As Hatakka concludes, these groups and individuals of online 
countercultures can be regarded as agents of meaning-making, who contest hegemonic social 
understandings and communicate marginalized understandings of society and its members’ 
relationships.61 
This is not to say, however, that memes or internet would be free of corporative or other hegemonic 
power. What should not be underestimated is the role of technology corporations, such as Google 
or Facebook, and their code and navigation tools that regulate online information diffusion. Major 
examples of this power are different algorithms, which have a huge influence on what content 
online users are viewing and in which order. As we have learned, search engine databases are also 
being exploited by some states (such as the US and China) in order to learn about their citizens, 
track down dissidents, and affect undesired content.62 This shows that different actors have realized 
the importance of internet as a political sphere. The so-called digital divide is also an existing 
problem, since in 2019 only 53.6 per cent of global population were using the internet. In Africa, 
only 28.2 per cent of individuals were online.63  The participatory culture of the internet is still to 
some extent a platform for the privileged.  
The plurality of voices on the internet also poses a threat of so-called echo chambers, where people 
search and engage only on sites that reflect their own opinions, which would be a setback for 
polyvocal and rich public discussion that is considered the cornerstone of democracy. Milner, 
however, has observed that this was not the case in Occupy Wall Street-related meme commentary 
of the internet, which went back and forth in expressing different positions.64 Based on my 
observations, Spanish internet discussion is fairly polyvocal and users are exposed to opposing 
opinions as well.  
1.4 Populism: Logic of Articulation, Ideology, Style or Toolkit? 
Why is understanding populism important for the analysis of political meme communication? As 
many scholars have argued, the architecture of social media (and the whole hybrid media system) 
seems to work particularly well with the underlying logic of populism.65 Many scholars suggest 
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that internet algorithms work in a logic that connects users with similar grievances, and at the very 
least, has made issue-specific collective action easier.66 Consequently, in the semipublic space of 
the social media, discussions are often polarizing, affective and antagonistic67, partly because the 
participants are not bound to formal behavior or “political correctness”.68 Be populism defined as 
an ideology, a logic of articulation, a political style or a strategic toolkit, it seems to be a prevalent 
feature of the online meme culture.  
Populism is one of the most abused terms even in academia and is used to refer to a wide range of 
different phenomena. Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser have provided a helpful 
minimal definition of populism. Their ideational approach, which represents the so-called “new 
mainstream in populism studies”69, suggest that populism is a thin-centered ideology that always 
includes an idea of confrontation between “the people” and “the establishment”, of which the latter 
is somehow guilty of obstructing the “general will” of the common people. This approach may 
help us to understand the chameleonic nature of populism, since a thin-centered ideology can be 
easily attached to different “thicker” ideologies such as socialism, nationalism or ecologism.70 
While this is a handy definition of what populism could be, it can only take us so far, as it seems 
to neglect how subjectivities like “the people” come into being. This approach seems to be painting 
a too essentialist and homogeneous picture of the two opposing camps in the society and defining 
populist reasoning as essentially moralistic.71 Stavrakakis and Jäger have criticized this notion by 
pointing out that invocation of moralization occurs across different political positions.72  
For the purposes of this study, I find Ernesto Laclau’s discourse-theoretical approach particularly 
useful. Laclau specifies how populism is not an ideology, a political regime or a way of 
understanding the world. It is rather a political logic to construct a frontier that divides society into 
two camps, us and them. Populist logic constitutes the political identity of “us” (usually referred 
to as the people) through antagonism towards “them” (the establishment, those in power).73 
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Populism, as a logic of articulation, turns “the people” into a collective subjectivity.74 Laclau 
perceives populism as a fundamental democratic activity and emancipatory force for groups in 
search of true social change. Populism in this understanding possibly brings new voices and real 
existing democratic demands, previously neglected by the establishment, to politics.75 Populism 
engages in a politicized meaning-making struggle and intends to fix meanings to a position that is 
favorable to its political agenda.76 
In his seminal work, On Populist Reason Laclau presents a theory on how populism may emerge. 
This process can be divided in three stages. Firstly, a possibility for the emergence of a populist 
subject opens when multiple social demands remain unfulfilled by the existing institutional order. 
Therefore, the incapability of the system to respond satisfactorily to social demands and grievances 
is a fundamental precondition of populism.77 Secondly, the multiple unfulfilled demands find 
common solidarity and are articulated into what Laclau refers to as “chain of equivalence”. In this 
discursive operation, the unsatisfied demands are linked to unite them against a common 
adversary, the establishment. This chain of unfulfilled demands starts to construct an unfulfilled 
totality. Finally, different demands are intertwined into a coherent and stable system of 
signification, a unified claim made by an apparent homogenous group, “the people”. “The people” 
as a collective subject can at this point come up against existing regime and demand change.78 
At the core of populism is, therefore, the construction of chains of equivalence or imagined 
alliances between various actors with unsatisfied social demands, and their transformation into a 
“people”, a unitary subject that can confront the existing order of the establishment.79 In Laclau’s 
understanding, what is distinctive for populism is that the totality it welds together is articulated 
around an antagonistic division of the society. The construction of a populist political identity 
around “the people” is based on an understanding, in which the perceived “lack” that is shared 
among the differential elements of the totality is seen as resulting directly from the existence and 
actions of an “other”, the establishment. The establishment, a constitutive outside, is 
simultaneously “the enemy of the people” and a necessary condition of its existence as a credible 
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political subject. In this notion, the demands of the people can only be met if the old establishment 
is shattered.80 For Laclau, populist articulation is not only about forming alliances between groups 
with different demands (for example groups that demand free university education, environmental 
protection or more public toilets), but to invent a totally new horizon for these groups to pursue 
social change collectively. The collective, which is commonly called “the people”, is never a given 
or an unchanging entity, but a subject of ongoing articulations, construction and discussion and 
thus the unity of this group is somewhat temporary and contingent.  
Laclau offers a few theoretical concepts that explain how populist actors manage to weave such 
differential elements into the tapestry that constitutes the populist collective. To consolidate the 
populist chains of equivalences, Laclau stresses the creation of empty signifiers, susceptible to be 
filled with one meaning or another in order to become common denominators for a diversity of 
elements.81 For instance, in the case of Podemos, a plurality of social demands, ranging from right 
to employment, housing, education and cancellation of unjust debt, are welded together around the 
empty signifiers such as democracy and the leader Pablo Iglesias.82 It is important to notice that 
the main categories of populism, the people and the elite, are both empty signifiers themselves, as 
there are multiple contents laying claim to these words.83 In a study that compared Twitter 
communication of the Spanish political parties from October 2015 to June 2016, Podemos was the 
party that used the term “people” (gente) most frequently. In Spanish political discourse the 
keyword “people” co-occured with adjectives such as normal, humble and hard-working, to 
emphasize positive evaluation of an already highly affective concept.84 The categorization of “the 
people” in the case of Podemos (and more widely in many progressive populist movements) is 
noticeably more open and inclusive than in most right-wing forms of populism that often exclude 
some groups from “the people” based on ideas related to nativism, for example.85  
Laclau also argues that some specific demand(s) in the chain of equivalence may achieve centrality 
and come to represent a larger end and the totality of the chain of demands of the movement. 86 In 
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the case of Podemos, for example, such demands are arguably ending austerity and corruption. 
Eklundh argues that given the heterogeneity of interests these empty signifiers and key demands 
ought to represent, there are no rational means to render them such universal position. Therefore, 
Eklundh underlines the affective investments in these particular words and expressions (and even 
practices and performances). She stresses the affective components needed in the constitution of 
political subjectivity.87 Chantal Mouffe, drawing from Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, also 
stresses the role of affects in the formation of political identities and the need for democratic 
politics to resonate with and to stimulate people’s desires and fantasies, rather than pure rational 
deliberation.88 
Mouffe explains how a “populist moment” may occur when political or socioeconomic 
transformations and multiplication of unfulfilled demands destabilize the dominant hegemony. 
Such occasion enables disarticulation of the historical bloc that provides the social basis for 
hegemony. This allows construction of a new collective subject, the people, and a possible 
rearranging of a social order that is seen as unjust. Mouffe perceives that such populist moment 
has indeed occurred in Western Europe as a consequence of “the consensus at the centre”, where 
differences between traditional left and right parties had become much less significant and voters 
were left with no real alternatives. One might justifiably ask whom the consensus actually 
benefited. Mouffe also stresses a lack of vibrant democratic debate, 89 a problem that has partially 
been addressed, for better or worse, by the online participatory culture, which has served as an 
important platform for the discursive hegemonic struggle. With the strong appeal of several anti-
establishment parties, Spain is certainly going through a populist moment, which remains 
unsettled.  
What Laclau’s theory does not explicate is the content of the societal demands that get articulated 
under the collective subject of “the people” (Laclau would have most likely argued that their 
content is contingent as long as they remain unsatisfied and do not clash with other demands in 
the same chain of equivalence90). Herkman concludes that Laclau has also been criticized for his 
understanding of populism, as it risks of encompassing virtually any political activity and therefore 
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is not very easily applied to empirical studies. He adds that Laclau’s theory is perhaps most useful 
in analyzing populism in the antagonistic political arena of Latin America or left-wing populism 
of the types of Spanish Podemos or Greek Syriza.91 Analyzing populism in the Spanish context 
through Laclau’s theoretical approach also seems reasonable because the leaders of Podemos were 
strongly influenced by the writings of Laclau and Mouffe. Íñigo Errejón, arguably the second most 
important figure in Podemos before his resignation, even used Laclauian theoretical framework in 
his doctoral thesis.92 
I find Benjamin Moffitt’s theory of populism as a political style to be a useful complementary 
approach to Laclau’s theory. There has been much discussion around the “performative turn” in 
social sciences.93 Similarly to Laclau, for Moffitt populism is something that is done rather than 
something that just inherently is. There is a clear notion that politics nowadays are increasingly 
mediatized and stylized, and therefore, aesthetic features have become a more central focus of 
analysis. As aesthetic and other non-verbal elements are discursive in a sense that they are able to 
signify, Moffitt broadens the scope of populism and stresses that populism is performed through 
verbal and non-verbal political communication.94 This is a useful notion for the analysis of 
memetic communication that transmits meanings not only through text or speech, but also through 
aesthetic and stylistic elements.  
Moffitt also gives a minimal definition of how populist style is done and specifies following 
features: appeal to “the people”, “bad manners” (or performance of ordinariness) and perception 
of crisis, breakdown or threat.95 For Moffitt’s performative approach, these features are manners 
rather than (thin) ideological content. In my view, these characteristics are just specific manners 
through which, the articulation of a populist chain of equivalence can occur, and as such, Moffitt 
offers a useful addition which gives certain firmness to the theorization of populism and puts the 
focus on particular type of movements in the political sphere.  
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By combining these two approaches, we notice how they supplement one another. Firstly, Laclau 
acknowledges the necessity of some degree of crisis in the old institutional system as a 
precondition of populism, since the existence of multiplicity of unfulfilled demands is crucial for 
articulating “the people”.96 Moffitt, on the other hand, underlines that crisis is a crisis only if it is 
performed or mediated. Populists tend to “spectacularize” the failures of the establishment and 
propagate a perception of crisis.97 We can visualize a situation where a system fails to satisfy 
various different social demands in a given time and where populist actor(s) actively work to 
highlight and spectacularize these failures to paint a picture of a severe crisis. This also reinforces 
the antagonistic relation between the people and the power bloc that helps to strengthen the 
populist chain of equivalences. I see that Podemos politicians in their rhetoric, as well as many 
Spanish meme images, are constantly offering such depictions of Rajoy’s administration.  
Secondly, I see the use of “bad manners” or “performances of ordinariness” as a performative act 
to differentiate oneself from the constitutive outside of the populist chain of equivalence that is the 
institutionalist political establishment, whose manners are based on professional etiquette and 
propriety. The institutionalist politicians are portrayed as being removed from the experience of 
"everyday citizens”98, while populists are often trying to present themselves as something that 
many people can relate to. Laclau’s reading of Sigmund Freud’s Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego suggests that the strong identification between the group and the leader is 
possible only if the leader presents features that he shares with those he is supposed to lead.99  
Moffitt’s and Laclau’s theories help us to understand how populism can appear in variety of 
different contexts and entangle itself almost anywhere on the ideological spectrum, from left to 
right and from conservative to progressive. They also explain the gradational nature of populism 
and reject the binary (populist or non-populist) understanding.100 Laclau also argues for the 
possibility of all actors being populist, while some being more populist than others are.101 As for 
Moffitt, political actors can use more or less populist style at different times and populist features 
can be found in the style of almost any politician. At the opposite end of this spectrum, Moffitt 
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observes technocratic political style, which also partly coincides with Laclau’s idea of pure 
populism and pure institutionalism being two impossible ends of the political spectrum.102  
Moffitt argues that mediatization has encouraged populist style of politics. Mediatization has 
increasingly submitted various spheres of social life, such as politics, to media logic since media 
favors the style that is closest to its own internal logic. This logic includes tendencies that 
inevitably shape contemporary politics such as simplification, visualization, polarization, anti-
establishment attitudes, emotionalization, and triumph of style over substance, focus on scandals 
and privileging of the visual over other senses. Moffitt sees that populism, out of different political 
styles, responds to these tendencies particularly well.103  
The logic behind internet memetics seems to overlap many elements of populist style. Since 
internet memes benefit from being quickly readable, simplification, dramatization and 
visualization are in the heart of their formula. The dramatization and indignation towards 
politicians in power that characterize political memes reflect a perception of an existing crisis or 
threat. They correspond to “bad manners” in their disregard of appropriateness or as Milner puts 
it; the logic that governs the formation of internet memes is “the logic of lulz” or “anything goes-
culture” rather than sensitivity on issues such as ethnic minorities or gender for instance.104 “The 
internet ugly aesthetics”105, which will be discussed more in chapter three, can be considered an 
example of “bad manners” or “performance of ordinariness”, as it emphasizes amateurism over 
expertise and grassroots expression over professional elite-lead media. Like populist leaders, 
members of these online cultures are also willingly hostile towards the mainstream media and 
other groups that are considered outsiders and often morally flawed.106 Memes are employed as 
inside jokes and work as differentiating performative acts between the in-group and the 
constitutive other.107 Interestingly, when it comes to politics, online meme imagery has sometimes 
aligned itself with populist actors. As Moffitt argues, populism is a “media-political form par 
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excellence at this particular historical juncture”, where media logic has colonized politics.108 I 
suggest that memes are an instrument par excellence to tap into all these different contemporary 
tendencies. 
Humor often seems to characterize both populist leaders and internet memes. Memes are an 
emotional form of communication.109 Humorous treatment of politics stirs up emotions in, 
sometimes dull, political discussion, which seems to characterize especially the technocratic 
political style. Humor also makes communication more ambiguous. This susceptibility to various 
interpretations may be useful for populism, as the chain of equivalence it is articulating is based 
on differential elements. Therefore, similarly to empty signifiers, a high variety of possible 
meanings given to a humorous message, can help populists to communicate to their manifold 
supporter base. Certainly, not all populist actors use humor in their performances. It is, however, 
noteworthy that a number of former professional comedians have become major populist players 
in politics (for instance Beppe Grillo in Italy, PM of Slovenia Marjan Sarec, President of Ukraine 
Volodymyr Zelensky and President of Guatemala Jimmy Morales), while many others have used 
comedy in their performance (Timo Soini and Boris Johnson etc.). Additionally, cynicism and 
bitterness seem to mark both populist and meme humor. Therefore, I argue that it is important for 
researchers to pay more attention to the understudied links between populism and humor.  
Apart from humor, I argue that populism research should look beyond populist leaders and see 
how other actors participate in constituting populist political identities and what are the means 
used in this communication. This is my main issue with Moffitt’s approach, as it heavily 
emphasizes populist leaders as the main performers of populism.110 As many recent studies 
suggest, political subjectivity never reaches full verticality or horizontality, but is always situated 
in flux.111 This is supported by Hatakka, who concludes that populist political communication is 
organizationally hybrid as acts of signification are made by various actors: party leaders, low-level 
party politicians, party supporters, parallel civic movements’ activists and others that claim or are 
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viewed to represent the collective subject, the people.112 Moffitt’s theory, however, is useful for 
analyzing such multipolar, complex and horizontal populist communication as well.  
Some scholars have already looked beyond populist leaders and taken important steps forward to 
fill this void. In a 2019 doctoral thesis, Hatakka makes an important contribution to populism 
literature by analyzing how the current hybrid media system affects populist logic of articulation 
and the process of constituting the populist political subject. He understands that, as the hybrid 
media system allows interactions between different actors, this process is susceptible to various 
interventions since the core ideas of the movement are communicated by multiple actors with 
differing views on the goals and means of action the movement should be taking. According to 
Hatakka, this grassroots discursive negotiation in the hybrid media system contributes greatly to 
how populist movements develop over time. Active online negotiation can affect what ends up 
articulated in the populist chain of equivalence.113  
In a 2017 doctoral thesis, Tuukka Ylä-Anttila theorized populism as a strategic toolkit from which 
any political actor can borrow elements. Importantly, he takes the focus from political leadership 
to ordinary citizens that take part in political and moral debates outside formal politics. The citizens 
can borrow from populist toolkits to give their actions meaning and to make sense of the world. 
Ylä-Anttila argues that since populism research has mostly been conducted by political scientists, 
it has focused too much on the sphere of party politics. Ylä-Anttila widens this scope by conducting 
a sociological research of extra-parliamentary usage of the populist toolkit.114 In my study on 
populist internet memes, I try to build bridges between different disciplines and combine the 
theoretical literature of political science on populism with cultural studies’ understanding of 
(popular) culture as “a critical site of social action and intervention, where power relations are both 
established and potentially unsettled”.115 
1.5 Materials and Methods 
The purpose of this study is to take the theoretical discussion on populism and political meaning-
making in the social media and consolidate it by using examples from the wealth of material 
provided by meme images about Mariano Rajoy. The main focus of this study will be on populist 
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communication through meme images. Memes about Rajoy, who at a time of strong populist 
mobilization was the figurehead of the institutionalist order, offer many examples of populist logic. 
As meme images are often humorous and therefore open for various interpretations, I do not 
consider it meaningful to name some meme images populist and others non-populist, but rather I 
suggest that features of populism can be found in political communication across the board. 
Despite the focus on populism, I also look to give a more comprehensive overall view on the 
different ways, which Rajoy is represented in the online meme imagery.  
I will be focusing on political meme images, not entire memes (which can consist of hundreds or 
thousands of images). Neither am I focusing on videos, GIFs or other digital items. Based on my 
observations, the meme image seems to be the most prominent form of the meme phenomenon. 
Due to its format, examples can be easily attached along the text. Therefore, for the purposes of 
this study, I see this as the most efficient way to analyze the political meme content on the internet.  
I have gone through hundreds of online meme images about Mariano Rajoy, from which I have 
picked and stored 136 items for closer analysis. As illustrative examples of this material, I have 
chosen 21 images that best represent the different features of the online meme imagery that 
comment on Rajoy. I will be using the whole material as a backbone for my analysis. Collation of 
my material took place between October 2016 and October 2019 from various different online 
sources. I have been following different Spanish Facebook groups and communities that post 
political memes, such as “Así Va España”, “Cuánta Razón”, “United Unknown”, “Democracia 
real YA” and “Spanish Revolution”, of which the latter two are closely linked with the 15-M 
Movement. On Twitter, I have searched with hashtags #SinMemesNoHayDemocracia and 
#TambienLosHipsters. I have made Google searches with entries such as “Rajoy meme”, “Rajoy 
chiste”, “Rajoy broma” and “Partido Popular meme”. I have also used news articles about internet 
memes, for example Vanitatis edition of the digital newspaper El Confidencial published a 
summary of 61 meme images about Mariano Rajoy to celebrate his 61st birthday in 2016.116  
Based on thematic analysis of the collected material, I suggest that memes about Rajoy can be 
divided into different themes based on their strategies and stances. By classifying meme material 
discussing the ex-Prime Minister Rajoy, I found three prominent strategies and stances.  
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1) Memes as shallow buffoonery or teasing. Meme images in this group include childish 
mockery of surface-level issues such as appearance, spoken delivery, mannerisms and/or 
laughable incidents. In this strategy, Rajoy is portrayed as a simple-minded, clumsy goof. 
2) Memes attacking hypocrisy, lies and corruption. Memes engage in serious satirical 
criticism with clear moral and ideological dimensions and subversive character. These 
memes seek to picture Rajoy as a criminal, corrupted and dishonest person, who takes 
advantage of his position in power. 
3) Memes accusing Rajoy for neoliberal austerity policies. Satire in these memes take on 
the shortcomings of the political system. These memes portray Rajoy as a puppet of the 
economic elite and/or the EU. Rajoy is not necessarily pictured as evil, but rather a 
suggestible and submissive politician.  
The boundaries of these categories are by no means completely clear and many political memes 
mix different strategies together. However, a relatively clear distinction can be observed between 
the first strategy and the latter two. As the first strategy stays on the level of light and good-
humored teasing, strategies two and three use humor with a greater purpose of serious social 
critique with a more antagonistic. In many respects, my distinction seems to coincide with Italian 
satirical playwright Dario Fo’s differentiation between satire and sfottò, which could be translated 
as teasing. Sfottò plays around with merely exterior attributes and never goes into deeper moral 
and ideological issues. Fo insists that while sfottò is something power loves, satire is something it 
detests.117 The distinction between the second and third category is rather thematic and stance-
related. Apart from the regional issues regarding Catalonia, corruption and austerity measures 
seemed to dominate Spanish political discussion during Rajoy’s terms. These topics arose from 
the meme material as well, and interestingly, but unsurprisingly, they coincide with the central 
demands of both the Indignados-movement and the populist party Podemos.  
Some additional themes of Rajoy meme images can be found as well (for example themes 
concerning Catalonia or re-conquest of Gibraltar). However, due to the limitations of this study, I 
will only analyze the three most prominent strategies. My categorization also excludes the political 
memes that take up a clearly positive position towards Rajoy. This is simply because positive 
memes about Rajoy or his political activities are extremely few compared to the negative ones, 
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and thus examining them within the limitations of this study would not be reasonable. As pointed 
out also by Ross and Rivers, internet memes often have a tendency to negatively characterize the 
politician they are targeting.118 
In order to find answers to my research questions and to understand the meme phenomenon, I am 
going to contextualize the images by using different sources about Spanish politics, political 
theory, internet culture and political humor, among others. My analysis starts from a standpoint 
that when studying such material as memes, we have no access to definitive knowledge about the 
intentions or meanings the creators are trying to transmit through these cultural items. Achieving 
such knowledge is not possible, not even through rigorous interpretative methods. From my 
standpoint, this is not even necessary. Consequently, of most significance when analyzing cultural 
items, are the different meanings, which the viewers can possibly give to them. Therefore, for me 
the underlying questions are what kind of cultural work meme images do and how these 
performative acts construct our understandings of the world and our shared assumptions about 
reality.  
The social constructivist theoretical-methodological framework I am using in this study draws on 
Laclau’s and Mouffe’s ideas of discursive constitution of the social and Laclau’s understanding of 
populism as a logic of articulation, complemented with Moffitt’s theory of populism as a political 
style, among others discussed in the previous subchapter. This provides a lens through which 
memes connect to a wider social and political context. Through this lens, I am going to analyze 
how meanings are articulated and shifted, how alternative understandings of social reality are 
propagated through memes and how the repetitive dissemination of these understandings challenge 
the other possible understandings. From the point of view of populism research, I am interested in 
the ways in which memes discursively draw political frontiers and articulate together differential 
elements. However, we should not consider these individual pieces of populist communication in 
isolation. We should rather analyze them in relation with other existing signifying acts and the 
bigger picture of a social movement that forms a large communicational mosaic,119 which 
articulates different demands to a populist chain of equivalence and constructs a political 
 
118 Ross & Rivers 2017.  
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subjectivity through antagonistic relation towards an out-group, which often is the political and 
economic establishment.  
Academic research around memes and their political use has increased in the last couple of years. 
It seems that many important elections and growing importance of the internet in political 
communication have sparked the curiosity of researchers towards political memes. With this study 
I aim to give a new perspective for the internet meme research as I will examine how memes 
perform as digital tools for populist communication. In the Spanish context, the research on 
internet memes has yet been scarce, but Xabier Martínez-Rolán and Teresa Piñeiro-Otero have 
analyzed the use of internet memes by political parties in Spain.120 Now I am going to look at some 
of the more interesting studies related to my research starting point.  
In his 2013 article, Ryan M. Milner researched political memes that commented on Occupy Wall 
Street-movement from various different standpoints. What made this study particularly interesting 
for my purposes was that it analyzed memes about a movement that was closely related to 15-M 
Movement in Spain. According to Milner, shows that online political engagement via memes faced 
no major problem of the so-called echo chambers, where participators would only engage with 
others that share similar opinions. In fact, quite the contrary, the meme commentary concerning 
Occupy Wall Street was polyvocal and multimodal. As Milner argues, meme images house good 
potential for populist communication. Meme cultures encouraged people to perform as citizens 
and in the case of Occupy Wall Street, express their opinions on such issues as wealth, power and 
inequality.121 While Milner focused on the analysis of memetic communication as polyvocal public 
conversation, his findings underline the need for further analysis on memes and their role in 
communicating populist notions.  
Andrew S. Ross and Damian J. Rivers have studied memes and their discursive strategies of 
delegitimization in the 2016 US presidential election. This study used a framework of four 
different strategies of legitimization developed by Van Leeuwen. These strategies are 
authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis. To examine how meme images 
express delegitimization, they used Van Leeuwen’s framework in a reverse way, and analyzed 
how meme creators and editors use these different strategies. Ross and Rivers have also observed 
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a negative stance that political internet memes often evidently take when characterizing their 
targets, and thus they chose the delegitimization as their fundamental approach.122 
Domagoj Bebic and Marija Volarevic examined a Facebook-based meme campaign in Croatia 
advocating the former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader and its influence on the stance of the national 
news media. As I demonstrate in my analysis, interactions between online meme communication 
and traditional news media was vibrant also in the Spanish context. The authors seemed strongly 
convinced about the important role of the internet memes in the contemporary political 
communication. They found out that the Facebook meme campaign gained significant attention 
and probably altered the public discussion but failed to convince the reader about its indisputable 
influence on the news media reporting.123  
A number of more general studies about internet memes has been published. For the purposes of 
this study I have found Limor Shifman’s theoretical discussion in the book Memes in Digital 
Culture particularly useful.124 Shifman, Noam Gal and Zohar Kampf, have also analyzed memes 
as performative acts in constructing collective identities and norms.125 Ryan M. Milner has studied 
the memetic “logic of lulz” and how it can provide a vibrant, polyvocal public discussion.126 
Graham Meikle interestingly analyzed memes as online remix culture in his book Social Media: 
Communication, Sharing and Visibility.127 Eliisa Vainikka’s article Avaimia nettimeemien 
tulkintaan — Meemit transnationaalina mediailmiönä128 also provided useful insights for the 
meme phenomenon.  
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1. Political Internet Meme — A New Form of Political Humor 
2.1 Internet Meme and Its Predecessors  
During the last couple of decades, the accelerating prevalence of the internet in our societies has 
provided a whole new arena for political participation. Especially the Web 2.0 has practically 
revolutionized the possibilities of the internet users to communicate with each other, create own 
content and get it spread out to many people online. Simultaneously scholars have observed an 
increasing tendency of humorous coverage of politics129 or combining “hard information” and 
entertainment, which has often taken the shape of a so called “soft news” show.130 The political 
meme capitalizes on both of these progressions, creating a platform for political humor in a new 
digital environment.  
Political internet meme has various predecessors in the field of political humor. The idea in most 
genres of political humor is to balance between public entertainment and social commentary. The 
political cartoons have been mocking politicians since the 18th century. They have been used to 
smear the opposition, but also to entertain, and in most cases in both purposes at the same time.131 
I see political meme images as an internet era continuum to the political cartoon that is mostly 
published in newspapers but has also been digitalized and appears on news media sites. Due to 
social and technological changes the news is more and more often read on the internet and the 
circulation of the printed newspapers has been in a continuous decline and, at the same time the 
satirical meme images on the internet seem to have become one of the superior ways to make 
political satire. Political cartoons have partially lost their place in the spotlight, since at least the 
internet versions of the biggest Spanish newspapers do not post them attached to the leading article, 
which is usually their prominent place in the printed versions. 
The political cartoon and the political meme images of the internet have some noteworthy 
differences. In political cartoons, the signature usually reveals the author’s name or pseudonym, 
while when it comes to internet memes, the creator of the re-mix usually remains anonymous and 
unknown when they are being spread from user to user on the net. They can be crafted by using 
rather straightforward and inexpensive or free software. Their creators usually recycle and re-mix 
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some already existing elements or create simplistic and intentionally ugly characters that can be 
described by the concept internet ugly aesthetics.132 Ergo, the production is also fairly easy and 
unlike in political cartoons, no artistic training or press mediation is necessary in order to create 
and spread them. Therefore, obvious limitations concerning appropriateness and stance to certain 
issues related to editorial control of the print press are in practice absent. Similarly, due to the logic 
of extreme re-mixing and ambiguity of authorship, it can be argued that the memetic images lack 
(perhaps intentionally) the artistic “aura” of the political cartoons (if even they are understood to 
have some of it left in the first place).  
The memetic images and editorial cartoons also have a lot in common. They are both visual culture 
artefacts and often combine images with text. Characterized by extensive intertextuality, they re-
utilize some well-known symbols, in order to communicate meanings to the viewers. In the case 
of editorial cartoons, these symbols have to be relatively easily recognized by the readers, whose 
background is usually quite heterogeneous when it comes to for example their age, education and 
political views. They normally include some of the most widely recognized symbols available in 
a given cultural setting. These symbols of popular culture are efficient tools used in political 
communication to express and evoke emotions that are central when shaping our individual and 
collective identities.133 Internet memes can utilize these popular culture elements in new creative 
ways, and even contain ambivalence and such movement of meaning, that the symbols are 
detached from their original sense and begin to signify something completely different.134 
Meme images, however, function in the context of the internet and often use imagery such as 
“Success Kid”, “Grumpy Cat”, “Pepe the Frog” and “Bad Luck Brian”, which can be described as 
inside jokes of the collective memory of web culture, in other words, memes.135 These rather 
ordinary pictures are repackaged with new meanings and start to signify something more precise 
for the internet community than what the original image lets one suppose. Sometimes the objective 
is to make them incomprehensible to the viewers who do not belong to a certain (internet) culture 
that shares this system of meanings. This performative act is used to differentiate the in-group 
from the “other”, which is the group that does not understand this system of meanings. Disparaging 
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(meme) humor works as a unifying act as it demonstrates superiority over these cultural 
outsiders.136 A famous example of this was the aftermath of the “Pepe the Frog”-scandal, when 
Reddit-users mocked the mainstream media and the Clinton campaign for not understanding the 
internet meme culture.  
The aforementioned memes were mostly developed in predominantly Anglophone websites such 
as Reddit and 4Chan, but through transnational online processes, Spanish internet users have 
become fairly familiarized with them. Therefore, Spanish meme imagery use these symbols as 
well, but based on my observations not to same extent as meme images in the US for example.137 
However, Spanish internet culture has developed some memes of its own.138 In fact, Mariano 
Rajoy has become an internet meme himself, as images of him are often used by Spanish internet 
users when responding to conversations that have nothing to do with neither Rajoy himself or the 
political sphere. The following images will exemplify how Spanish meme images intertextually 
utilized different popular culture elements to communicate views on Rajoy. I will also give a 
comparative example of how political cartoonist Ricardo has utilized similar elements in his satire.  
 
 
Figure 1: Mariano Rajoy as Bad Luck  
Brian 
 
136 Pearce 2015.  
137 See Milner 2012.  
138 See for example Julio Iglesias “Y lo sabes”-meme.   
Figure 2: Rajoy as Despiderman 
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Figure 3: El Mundo editorial cartoon by Ricardo 
Figure 1 is a re-mix of the “Bad Luck Brian” meme, originally uploaded to the social news 
aggregation site Reddit in 2012. “Bad Luck Brian” meme has since then been re-mixed countless 
of times and the users have added captions that describe different embarrassing, unfortunate or 
tragic occurrences.139 Memes originate with a shared idea, form and/or stance but are constantly 
remixed in new variations. Therefore, in order to be in on the joke, one has to understand both the 
original form (in this case recognize the clothing of Bad Luck Brian) and the remix (why Rajoy is 
now Bad Luck Brian). In this particular remix, “Bad Luck Brian” is accompanied by a caption that 
says: “A youngster delivers a punch in his face in the middle of an electoral visit in Pontevedra — 
Turns out to be a relative of his wife.” The caption refers to an incident during the electoral 
campaign 2015, in which Rajoy was punched by a 17-year-old citizen whilst meeting people on 
the streets of his hometown.140 Later the newspapers discovered that the suspect’s mother is 
actually Rajoy’s wife’s cousin.141 The face of “Bad Luck Brian” has been replaced in this re-mix 
by a photo of Rajoy’s face after the incident. Rajoy has thus been put in the usual position of “Bad 
Luck Brian”, being involved in an embarrassing chain of events. This meme image is simply taking 
information that was widely available in news media, using a symbol that is recognized by many 
internet users (Bad Luck Brian-meme), replacing the face with a non-flattering (and possibly 
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edited) picture of Rajoy after being punched, and by doing that, managing to create a humorous 
and derisive image of Rajoy. It exemplifies how in the hybrid media system meaning-making 
power is fragmented as internet activists can nudge information flows to directions that are 
convenient for their goals.142 This image, apart from ridiculing the former Prime Minister, 
increases visibility of this particular event and frames it to look as embarrassing as possible for 
Rajoy. 
The other two images use cultural symbols that originate from offline popular culture. They utilize 
widely known superhero characters, Spiderman and Superman, which originally appeared in the 
comics of Marvel and DC Comics, but have later featured in various films, TV-series, video games 
and other formats. Arguably, nearly all internet users or newspaper readers in Spain can recognize 
these symbols and comprehend the qualities connected to superheroes in western popular culture, 
which generally include for instance superpowers and righteousness. In both images, the superhero 
symbol has been re-mixed and Rajoy’s face has replaced the face (or mask) of the superhero. In 
the editorial cartoon, the Superman’s S-logo in his chest has been replaced by an R-logo, which 
refers to the family name Rajoy.  
Figure 2 presents Rajoy’s head edited to the body of the superhero Spiderman, accompanied by a 
text that says in Spanish: “Despiderman, superhero of unemployment.” Despiderman is hence a 
twisted version of Spiderman. His name comes from mixing the Spanish term for dismissal 
(despido) and the name of the Marvel comic character, Spiderman. His status as a superhero has 
also been turned upside down. Being a superhero of unemployment, he has actually become an 
antihero. This refers to the high unemployment, which was one of the major problems of the 
country during Rajoy’s term in office.143  
On the bottom of the image, serious-looking people are making a line next to an INEM-sign.144 
The representation of “the people” in a miserable situation, while Rajoy is fooling around in tights 
as if helping the citizens, highlights a populist notion of the irresponsibility of the political elite 
being the cause of the suffering of the populace. Nevertheless, Rajoy cannot be solely blamed for 
the high unemployment numbers, although the image can be interpreted to propagate such 
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understanding. The high unemployment rate in Spain is a symptom of a longer chain of events, 
political decisions and the global financial crisis that started in 2007.145  
In the editorial cartoon, DC Comics character Superman is being harnessed to describe Rajoy’s 
self-image. The cartoon refers to a comment by the president of the Junta of Castile and León, 
Juan Vicente Herrera Campo (also a member of the People’s Party), in 2015, in which he suggested 
that Rajoy should look at himself in the mirror before running in the elections again. He suggested 
a renovation in his party after a disappointing performance in the 2015 elections of the autonomous 
communities. The satirical version of Rajoy in the cartoon thinks that this is “nonsense” and that 
he already does it every morning. By picturing Rajoy seeing himself as Superman in the mirror, 
the artist creates a humorous view of Rajoy’s self-image, seeing himself as a supernaturally able 
and righteous character, even after suffering a setback in the elections and receiving clear signals 
of a lack of confidence on behalf of his party colleagues.146 
The People’s Party’s Parliamentary group did not seem too concerned about the mockery that 
appears on the pages of the newspapers, but instead the meme ridicule of the internet seemingly 
raised their concern. Research on political satire seems to affirm its influence on political opinions 
and historically there are some famous examples of the power of political cartoons. Thomas Nast’s 
cartoons managed to cause such harm to one of the leading figures of New York politics in the 
19th century, William M. Tweed, that he famously stated: “I don’t care what they print about me, 
most of my constituents can’t read anyway…But them damn pictures!” and offered Nast half a 
million dollars to go study in Europe, evidently to get rid of him.147 Political cartoon is also said 
to have affected the ending of Richard Nixon’s presidency.148 Spanish newspapers such as El País 
and El Mundo also publish editorial cartoons, and the satirical magazine El Jueves even faced 
lawsuits for offending the royal family in 2007.149  
Other significant platforms for political satire in the last 20 years have been the widely studied 
news shows The Daily Show and The Colbert Report. In Spain, a show of a very similar format is 
El Intermedio, headlined by the comedian El Gran Wyoming. As Shifman suggests, meme images 
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can be seen as a bottom-up, digital incarnations of the jokes made in the satirical TV-shows that 
try to reveal the absurdity and hypocrisy of the politicians’ public image strategies.150  
Most of these TV comedians strictly renounce their implied influence on society. Richard Van 
Heertrum argues in his article Irony and the News: Speaking Through Cool to American Youth that 
purported apolitical intentions of the TV-comedians are, in fact, simply part of a strategy to protect 
them from deeper political engagement, and to maintain an image of coolness, which is 
fundamental in connecting with the millennial151 generation. Irony, satire and cynical stance of the 
political humor are important tools to point out and challenge the inconsistent and hypocritical acts 
and statements of the politicians.152 A cynical stance may communicate effectively with the 
Spaniards of which the majority, according to barometers of October 2016, believed that both the 
political and economic situation in the country are more likely to get worse than better in the course 
of a year.153 This, I would argue, applies especially to the millennial generation, which has been 
the most affected group by the grave economic crisis that struck the country in 2008. Young 
generations in Spain have experienced immense difficulties in accessing the labor market, and 
according to scholars, are going to live in worse economic conditions than the generation of their 
parents.154 In Spain, young voters also seem to be especially weary of the traditional parties 
(People’s Party and PSOE) that have controlled Spanish party politics since the 1980’s.155 
Political memes usually refrain from explicit political partisanship, thus trying to position 
themselves above the presented issues or politicians, which is also a more general strategy of 
humor. As early as in the first century BC, Roman philosopher Cicero perceived that laughter can 
be deployed to defeat an adversary and to demonstrate superiority.156 Following Antonio 
Gramsci’s theory, political satire of this type can be seen to have counter-hegemonic features, 
since it aims to subvert the official discourse and reconstruct the meaning of its objects.157 
Cartoonists, TV-comedians and internet meme activists can thus be seen to possess a role of 
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coordinators and perhaps even educators contributing to counter-hegemonic projects against the 
official discourse of the ruling politicians. This role may be particularly important in Spain, where, 
according to Iñaki Zabaleta, the main news media outlets have traditionally shifted their 
viewpoints after the ruling party, which has resulted in information blackouts about non-desired 
issues.158 
The satirical news shows and editorial cartoons however do have certain limitations when 
performing in their tasks of raising awareness and affecting the perceptions of the public. Van 
Heertrum argues, that because of the cynicism of the satirical shows, the components for positive 
social transformation, hope and affirmative politics, are out of their reach. They can, nonetheless, 
serve as a push towards more serious social critique.159 As I have argued earlier, the editorial 
cartoons are also losing their highly visible arena next to the leading articles of the newspapers 
due to digitalization. Political memes, however, are in the vanguard of taking advantage of the 
participatory culture of the internet, which is crucial in their search of a wider audience. They have 
proved their contagious or spreadable abilities on many occasions, and in the next chapter, I am 
going to look at this so-called virality or spreadability of the internet memes.  
2.2 Virality or Spreadability? 
Limor Shifman understands memes as pieces of “cultural information that pass along from person 
to person, but gradually scale into a shared social phenomenon”.160 This definition raises a 
question about the elements that enhance their ability to spread. The concept of virality has been 
used to understand this phenomenon. The term virality comes from the word virus; viral cultural 
items spread around in social interactions in a similar way viruses spread from one cell to another. 
Virality, therefore, is the tendency of an item to be propagated from one person to another.    
Internet has revolutionized the propagation of information and increased global connectivity. 
According to a study on Facebook users, in 2016 each user was connected to every other user by 
3.57 persons on average, in this network of 1.6 billion people (over 2.5 billion monthly active users 
in 2020).161 This creates a space of great potential for cultural contagion that can expose people to 
trends, ideas and even political views. These pieces of cultural information are being propagated 
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from person to person by imitative repetition, and finally, adaptation, which requires repetition 
and interaction of different influences. Tony D. Sampson argues in his book Virality: Contagion 
Theory in the Age of Networks that in this epidemiological social space full of accidentality, virality 
could, however, be steered towards certain desired reactions in the public. This can be done, for 
example, by generating viral fear or viral love.162 Despite Sampson’s idea of how virality can be 
steered to different directions, the concept itself is problematic for much of the current social 
science that emphasizes human agency. Jenkins, Ford & Green have criticized the idea of viral 
media, since it mystifies the process and trivializes the human agency in spreading content. They 
argue that people make conscious decisions and pursue their own agenda when making, sharing 
and remixing media online. Hence, they suggest that the concept spreadable, rather than viral, 
should be used to describe these processes.163 
Limor Shifman has highlighted similar features that can make internet content viral or spreadable. 
She argues that people tend to share content that generates positive feelings, not only because they 
want to delight the people receiving it, but also because they want themselves to be associated with 
positivity. Many scholars have also discovered humorous content to be eminently spreadable due 
to its tendency to be surprising. Surprise invokes emotional arousal, which itself, as discovered 
also by Sampson, is highly viral. Another common feature for most spreadable internet content is 
its simplicity. Short and clear tend to be more sharable than long and complex. This is however a 
double-edged sword; in the case of political memes this might reduce a complex issue to a 
simplistic frame.164  
In the light of these observations, it seems to be no coincidence that some memetic political images 
have spread far and wide. Certain political issues can be negative, complex and even dull. Political 
memes often use humor to give these issues a more positive tone and a surprise element to create 
an urge to share them. Political memes also report about given issues in a very compact and simple 
way, which gives them a much more sharable form than many other types of political content on 
the internet.  
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2.3 Internet Memes as Personalized Political Action 
A general perception nowadays seems to be that political participation extends to much more 
mundane activities than voting or joining political organizations. Web 2.0 has broadened the 
spectrum of political participation outside these traditional participation channels. One of its most 
celebrated features is that, unlike the old media it allows users to have an active role in creating, 
remixing and sharing content. Meme images have become vital tools for online political 
participation and they can be created by anyone without being dependent of an established political 
organization, a feature, which may be one key to their success. Lance Bennett and Alexandra 
Segerberg suggest that a growing number of citizens are less likely to view traditional political 
organizations as avenues for engaging with social issues that concern them. Citizens are 
increasingly looking for more personalized paths for engagement – a politics by more self-
expressive and self-satisfying means. The palpable creating, sharing and remixing of internet 
memes that celebrates individual creativity can provide a more personal experience that allows 
citizens to specify their own connection to an issue rather than adopt a rigid ideological stance and 
identity. Personal action frames do not specify identity in a narrow way, and therefore enable more 
fluid movement beyond identity boundaries.165   
This logic has been analyzed as connective action (cp. collective action, which requires high level 
of organizational resources and cultural production work to get people to adopt a collective 
identity). Connective action relies on self-motivated participation of autonomous actors that 
propagate personalized ideas and content over social networks. Nevertheless, this allows these 
actors to work together to produce action frames and discursively constitute political subjects such 
as protest movements or parties.166 Spanish Indignados-movement was organized largely through 
connective action logic, as it was not backed by a large mobilizing organization, but rather 
organized through fluid social networking in digital technology platforms.167 I argue that for 
Indignados, meme images provided an accessible and inexpensive personal action frame through 
which anyone could autonomously express their own emotions, views and bring up new topics to 
discussions.  
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Chantal Mouffe warns us from going too far and having too much confidence in the prevailing 
notion of the disappearance of collective political identities, redundancy of defining political 
adversaries and the triumph of individualism. She argues that the collective dimension is an 
imperishable element of politics and as the emergence of new populist movements illustrates, 
politics always consists in the construction of “we” of some sort. Rather the formation of 
completely new political subjectivities is possible and even necessary as an increasing number of 
social demands are neglected and left floating around in the society. This has caused mistrust 
towards the traditional parties and political organizations.168  
This seems to pave the way for personal action frames of the user-generated content, since it is 
perceived as being independent from the traditional political organizations. In fact, as Shifman 
concludes, studies have shown that the number of views gathered by political video ads designed 
by nontraditional political actors such as individual citizens or other small-scale producers was 
more than tenfold compared to typical party-sponsored or candidate-sponsored ads.169 The 
sometimes excessive do-it-yourself shape and the Dadaist “internet ugly aesthetic” of the memetic 
images work as differentiating factors between them and the neater layout of the content provided 
by the official sources. This can provide them with an image of independence and authenticity. 
Internet memes are often shared between friends or acquaintances in different networks. According 
to Shifman, personal influence is a pivotal persuading factor; people seem to listen to what their 
friends and relatives think about politics. People tend to treat political content, forwarded to them 
by someone they know, more favorably than the content received directly from traditional 
broadcasters.170 However, it has become increasingly questionable whether we can draw a clear 
line between the user-generated political content and content created by governments, corporations 
or media outlets. As spreading disinformation and provoking polarization via fake online personas 
has been one of the strategies by which foreign governments have interfered elections, it seems 
that these government-funded campaigns are trying to benefit from the persuading effect of peer-
to-peer contact. This is something researchers have to take into consideration when analyzing 
memes.  
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I argue that politicians who can be seen as outdated or old-fashioned, and thus uncool and 
ultimately not able to understand internet culture, are the ones that become objects of the most 
mischievous and pitiless internet mockery. These politicians seem to represent the constitutive 
outside of the internet culture, a part of the society that is perceived as being stuck in the past. For 
the Spanish internet community, Mariano Rajoy seemingly became the ultimate “other”.  
Undoubtedly, internet meme images generally take a negative stance towards politicians and 
politics. However, occasionally memes seem to embrace or admire some of them. Mariano Rajoy 
got constantly mocked by memes, but politicians such as Pablo Iglesias, Bernie Sanders and 
Barack Obama have at times even gained their support. 
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2. Memes as Shallow Buffoonery 
3.1 Memes and Surface-Level Mockery 
Political memes have become an important platform for political participation in Spain. It is 
virtually impossible to imagine elections without a simultaneous surge of hundreds of memes 
related to political issues. In the following chapters, I will examine in more depth different meme 
images and their strategies. This study focuses on political memes particularly in the Spanish 
context. These memes are mostly very culture-specific and mainly use the Spanish language, 
which define the boundaries of their sphere of influence. Their formula, however, is transnationally 
shared and some features and inside jokes pertain to the collective memory of the internet. Memes 
can be simultaneously global and local.171  
In the first chapter I divided Mariano Rajoy-themed meme images into three strategical categories. 
In this chapter I will analyze the first strategy that consists of superficial mockery. Memes in this 
strategy often include features such as seemingly innocent carnivalesque or mockery over personal 
issues, while always staying on the surface-level. My classification seems to coincide closely with 
the Italian satirical playwright Dario Fo’s description of sfottò, teasing. Fo considers sfottò a type 
of buffoonery that laughs at external attributes such as physical defects, particular pronunciation, 
mannerisms, style of dress, the way one walks and the typical phrases one repeats. He adds that 
this type of humor never makes moral evaluations or judges the ideological choices of the person 
in question.172 The problem with the memes in this category can be their superficial nature – they 
might empty politics of its content and might even draw sympathy and humanize politicians whose 
actual policies should be put under serious scrutiny. 
Internet is a relatively liberal environment – everything can be laughed at and nobody is safe from 
ridicule. Memes are an emotional form of communication and even offensive diction is part of 
their culture.173 As Milner argues, in internet memetics, “the logic of lulz” prevails political 
correctness.174 Mariano Rajoy seems to be an excessively “memable” politician and the internet is 
making the most of it. His comical facial expressions captured on camera, clumsy postures, public 
 
171 Vainikka 2016, 12.  
172 Fo in Pelegi & González Royo 2006, 303.  
173 Vainikka 2016, 25−26. 
174 Milner 2013. 
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plunders, mistakes in speeches, unintended lisp in his pronunciation and seemingly, unpopular 
persona have made him a laughingstock of many memes in this category. Many of these meme 
images seem harmless and merely serving in entertaining purposes and the logic behind them 
seems to prefer a good laugh over political influencing. They rarely discuss strictly political issues 
and are, in fact, more ad hominem type of attacks.  However, it can be argued whether this kind of 
mockery would have some impact on an era where the likeability and public image of the 
candidates seem to be among the most decisive factors in elections.  
This study looks to analyze how populism is communicated through meme images. However, as I 
intend to give a complete overview about the memetic material commenting Rajoy, it is important 
to also include images that do not engage in serious critique over ideological choices or policies, 
but rather focus on surface-level issues and light-hearted humor. Images in this category, which 
form a large part of Rajoy-themed online meme material, are not articulating explicitly populist 
understandings of society. However, they can still resonate with Benjamin Moffitt’s ideas of how 
populism is performed through a certain political style. Moffitt argues that different political styles 
can be distinguished and, in addition to rhetorical elements, these include components such as 
body language, self-presentation, images, aesthetics and manners. He describes political style as a 
repertoire of embodied performance. He also perceives that politics have become more “’stylized’, 
mediatized and spectacular”, and in this context, he argues, it is not surprising that populism has 
become such a significant feature in politics.175 The meme images in this chapter can be seen as 
mockery of these stylistic and aesthetic aspects of Rajoy’s political style, which in Moffitt’s 
understanding could definitely be described more technocratic than populist. 
 
175 Moffitt 2016, 28–50. 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Save Rajoy 
 
 
In these two images, we can see how memes resonate with Moffitt’s ideas. In figure 4, Rajoy’s 
face is edited to Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias’ body accompanied by a caption that states: “Rajoy 
prepares a plan to recover the youth’s confidence in his party”. Iglesias’ typical layman’s attire 
with jeans, casual shirt and ponytail hair is emphasized here as a great contrast to Rajoy’s 
traditional politician-look. Iglesias’ casual style can be seen as “bad manners” or “performance of 
ordinariness”, which Moffitt describes as characteristic to populist style. Populist politicians tends 
to demonstrate their refusal with elite tastes by, for example, refraining from fancy meals or 
wearing casual clothing such as leather jackets instead of a suit.176 The meme image points out the 
importance of aesthetic elements in politics, while the underlying idea seems to be that aesthetics 
is not enough if the content is not in line with it. It seems to maintain that no matter what superficial 
tricks Rajoy tries, at the end of the day, the actual content of his policies is never going to convince 
the youth and that the justified perception is that he is not genuinely interested in solving the 
problems of the youth. Furthermore, it seems to hold Iglesias as the champion of the youth. This 
 
176 Knight 1998, 245. 
Figure 4: Rajoy for the youth 
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image can be seen to be in close relation with the memetic critique analyzed in subchapter 4.3, 
where Rajoy’s fabrication attempt to make the party look more youthful was put under ridicule.  
Figure 5, which relates to the situation where Rajoy’s government faced a motion of no-
confidence, underlines Moffitt’s observation that politics has increasingly become a spectacle. The 
image portrays Rajoy as if he was a reality TV-show participant on a razor’s edge and that the 
viewers could decide his destiny by sending a text “Save Rajoy”. It seems to laugh at the 
spectacularization and mediatization of politics as the plenary sessions of the Parliament have 
become reality TV.  
3.2 Rajoy as a Parkour Enthusiast 
Memes can surge out of almost anything – seemingly uninteresting images, video clips, phrases 
or ideas can evolve into a meme. This has also happened to some pictures of Rajoy as well as some 
phrases he has publicly said. These pictures and phrases have evolved into internet phenomena as 
they have been shared among users, who have constantly come up with new versions by re-mixing 
the original elements. Rajoy’s imaginary parkour affection became an inside joke in the Spanish 
online community. 
 
Figure 6:  Rajoy as a Parkour enthusiast Figure 7:  Rajoy in a wrestling match 
In the figure 6, Rajoy is captured in a humorous posture probably during one of his quotidian 
walks.177 While he is supposedly stretching, the caption states: “Parkour is my life, the streets are 
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my territory”. This bold use of imagination constructs a carnivalesque situation of humorous 
absurdity and unexpectedness. Rajoy’s conservative, moderate and even dull public image 
hilariously fails to match with parkour, whose practitioners’ anarchistic use of obstacles in urban 
and rural settings seem to preach an entirely different set of values. Parkour is a discipline whose 
practitioners aim to move as efficiently as possible through different obstacles in their path by, for 
example, running, climbing, vaulting and jumping.178 
Rajoy’s political style resembles what Moffitt would call technocratic. Among other features, 
Moffitt argues that populist style relies on affects by using emotional and passionate performances, 
while technocratic style fosters emotional neutrality and rationality. Rajoy’s hobbies, taking walks 
either in the nature or on a treadmill179, fit his overly rational and restrained style – calm and low-
risk exercise that benefits health. In this context, it seems highly unlikely that parkour would be 
something Rajoy appreciates, let alone practices himself. This outlandish memetic reframing 
underlines the dullness of Rajoy’s style.  
In the picture, his athleticism does not seem quite as convincing as that of many parkour 
practitioners. His stance looks rather clumsy, while his facial expression and gaze look very 
determined, which, combined with the caption, makes this meme image laughable even without 
the viewer being acquainted with the political context. It can, however, be interpreted that this 
imaginary parkour-enthusiast Rajoy, as an overly-confident character despite his seemingly 
limited abilities, is an allusion to his performance as a politician, which is sometimes described in 
a parallel manner.180 Whether this meme image was meant to have such connotation or not, it most 
certainly wants to portrait Rajoy as a clumsy, goofy and out-of-touch character.  
This picture of Rajoy, like so many others, has evolved into a meme. Apart from captioning and 
cropping the original photo, Rajoy, with his leg stretched out, has also been edited to completely 
different contexts, as can be seen in the figure 7. Rajoy appears in another absurd setting; in a 
professional wrestling ring, kicking a wrestler in the middle of a huge crowd. This particular image 
is a great example of how memes evolve. Re-mixes such as this are being made and new influences 
are being added on the same basis with great creativity. The meme of Rajoy as a parkour enthusiast 
 
178 World Freerunning Parkour Federation. What is parkour? 
179 Ruiz Valvidia, Huffington Post 29.10.2016. 
180 See for example figure 3.  
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has also bloomed and some other photos of him have been harnessed to laugh at this imaginary 
memetic hobby of him. One user even published a video on Youtube with a title “GTA V: Rajoy 
tries parkour”, including gameplay of Grand Theft Auto V video game while commenting the 
events with an imitation of Rajoy’s lisp. After a series of clumsy jumps and terrifying (and fatal) 
falls from different obstacles, the voice imitating Rajoy comments “I just cannot stop making 
mistakes, which many people say I also make politically”.181 We can see that despite the light-
hearted tone of this humor, its practitioners are often also critical to the actual policies of the person 
they are laughing at.  
Rajoy’s parkour affection is just one of many examples of inside jokes of the internet. While this 
meme seems relatively good-willed some others have taken a meaner tone and touched on issues 
that are potentially more sensitive. In the following subchapter, I will analyze how memes have 
targeted Rajoy’s problematic spoken delivery.  
3.3 Seriously? — Rage Comics and Rajoy’s Gaffes  
Internet has accelerated the circulation of cultural influences transnationally and for example rage 
comics, which first appeared on the 4chan website, have been adopted to participate online 
discussions all over the world. They consist of “rage faces”, which are simple characters that help 
users to express different emotions. Created by such software as MS Paint and often devoid of 
artistic brilliance182, they are in fact a grand example of the internet ugly aesthetic, a celebration 
of sloppy and novice-like production183, which emphasizes the user-generated nature of the Web 
2.0, contrasting television and print where the amateurish is marginalized. This stylistic choice 
inevitably constructs meaning, as it seems to disregard the aesthetic canon of the mainstream media 
and emphasize its position in the counter-culture.  
This can be an effective way to point out that a given meme image is work of a fellow netizen, 
which resonates with Moffitt’s idea of “performance of ordinariness” or “bad manners” (in the 
aesthetic self-performance). Moffitt focuses on political leaders as the main performers of 
populism,184 a view, which I do not completely share. In a current hybrid media system, a web of 
interconnected individuals can “do” populism without a necessity of a top-down type of leadership. 
 
181 Youtube 2016. GTA V: Rajoy Intenta Parkour.  
182 Knowyourmeme.com. Rage Comics. 2007–2017.  
183 Douglas 2014, 1–2.  
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Many Spanish meme images criticizing Rajoy can be seen as artefacts used in this populist 
communication. In a populist style, they willingly emphasize their amateurish nature and 
background in “normal people”, thus hinting at representing the voice of the people, vox populi, 
which potentially gives these artefacts more authenticity and perhaps a better ability of persuasion. 
This is, however, in some cases questionable since for example a PSOE politician has been caught 
crafting meme images.185 In the following meme image, Rajoy’s lapsus in his speech is being 
ridiculed by using rage faces to express presumable emotions of “the people”.  
 
Figure 8: Rajoy and Rage comics 
 The picture and the catchphrase of Rajoy are from 
his speech during an electoral campaign for Spanish 
local elections in May 2015.186 This confusing 
sentence could be translated in a following way: 
“Spain is a great nation and the Spaniards very 
Spanish and much/many Spanish.” Rajoy is not 
known as a natural born speaker and his speeches 
have become an object of ridicule. Apart from his lisp (not limited to the common lisp in the 
Castilian Spanish) and lack of knowledge of foreign languages,187 his verbal slips occasionally 
turn out as incomprehensible or ridiculous sentences. This particular sentence of Rajoy seems to 
have a tautological188 mistake and/or an erroneous use of the word “mucho”.  
Four characters that pertain to the rage comic genre have been edited to the montage in order to 
make a humorous and emotional commentary on Rajoy’s blunder. The rage face in the upper left 
corner is known as “Are You Fucking Kidding Me?” which is usually used to demonstrate a 
scornful attitude towards someone else’s overwhelming stupidity.189 This rage face has been 
largely superseded on the internet by the “Are You Serious Face” or “Seriously?” that can be found 
in the lower left corner of the image. Originally inspired by the puzzled expression on the face of 
 
185 Alguacil Pérez, El Mundo 8.9.2016.  
186 La Sexta 13.7.2015.  
187 “It’s very difficult todo esto.” On a widespread video Rajoy mixed English and Spanish when trying to speak 
with the former British PM David Cameron.  
188 Literary Devices. Tautology. Tautology is stating the same thing twice in a redundant way. 
189 Knowyourmeme.com. Are You Fucking Kidding Me? 2007−2017.  
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David Silverman of American Atheists when debating conservative television host Bill O’Reilly 
in 2011, this rage face is utilized as a reaction to incomprehensible ignorance or stupidity. Different 
female versions were also launched that same year, one of them edited to this image as a reaction 
to Rajoy’s sentence.190 This is a great example of the intercultural nature of the internet. The fourth 
rage comic character is known as “Poker Face”, used to illustrate awkward and embarrassing 
emotions.191 In this setting, the character can be interpreted to go through feelings of 
embarrassment caused by the performance of Mariano Rajoy.  
The rage faces here can be interpreted to represent the emotions of “the people” towards the lapsus 
of the Prime Minister. All the characters are expressing desperate disbelief, disappointment and 
even anger of what they have just heard. As affects are an important element in politics, feelings 
of anger and indignation (cp. Indignados movement) are usually projected onto the political 
establishment and the economic elites, in the name of the project of social justice.192 In fact, as the 
name suggests, the collective subjectivity of the Indignados (as well as Podemos) is entwined 
around affective and emotional components, rather than only rational expressions. As Eklundh 
argues, in this understanding affects are not disjointed from signification, but rather a central 
element of it.193 Memes, such as rage comics, are a simple and effective way to express emotions 
and, therefore well suitable for populist communication that looks to express and channel these 
emotions against the establishment.   
Spanish national unity has been put under serious question in Spain in recent years. By 
emphasizing Rajoy’s gaffe in this pompous phrase, the meme image seems to be highlighting how 
desperately he is trying to defend a unified Spanish nation. His nationalist rhetoric and the meme 
response to it can be analyzed through Laclau’s theoretical framework of populism. As Laclau 
understands, populist logic tries to divide the society into two camps between the power 
bloc/establishment and plebs, the underprivileged. Rajoy’s institutionalist logic, on the other hand, 
attempts to build a discursive formation in such way that it coincides with the limits of the 
community, in this case all Spanish citizens.194 What Rajoy seems to be attempting is to impede 
the populist endeavor to construct a dichotomic frontier inside the society that looks to place 
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popular demands on one side and the establishment on the other. It is also likely that he is 
articulating the national unity due to separatist tensions in Catalonia and Basque Country. These 
movements are trying to draw their own frontiers, while disregarding their internal differences 
such as political views in the name of nationalism as a common point of reference for 
mobilization.195 I suggest that this meme image is therefore not only ridiculing Rajoy’s verbal slip, 
but can be also seen as resistance and mockery towards Rajoy’s desperate attempt to reunite the 
Spanish society and the chasms that seem to be forming inside of it due to both nationalist and 
populist discursive acts of frontier drawing.  
Despite some more serious undertones, the meme images in this chapter focused on light 
buffoonery and stayed on the surface-level. These memes did not make any serious moral or 
ideological evaluations. They rather made a spectacle of Rajoy’s clumsiness, dullness and his 
public gaffes, which eventually turned into inside jokes in the Spanish online community. As I am 
writing this thesis in spring 2020, almost two years after he left politics, Rajoy remains an 
important character in the memetic toolkit of the Spanish online users, as images of him are still 
being used in communication similar to the examples in this study.  
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3. Memes Waging War against Hypocrisy and Corruption 
4.1 Memes and Hypocrisy   
In this chapter the political memes take a leap onto the field of more serious social critique. These 
political memes leave behind the shallow buffoonery of the first strategy and take on clearly moral 
and ideological dimension by discussing lies, corruption and hypocrisy. The meme imagery 
discussed in this chapter depicts Rajoy as a corrupt politician that practically empties citizens’ 
pockets, an analogy, which underlines the concrete damages caused by far-encompassing 
corruption. The humor in this category is clearly satirical as it has a subversive and militant 
character. Italian satirist Dario Fo argues that satire focuses on serious flaws of politicians, their 
more or less concealed wrongdoings, their arrogance and above all, their hypocrisy.196 Rajoy’s 
hypocrisy seems to have a central role in the online meme material. These memes contrast 
relatively clearly the memes in the first strategy, where Rajoy is shown as a clumsy and simple, 
but harmless figure. In the upcoming memes, Rajoy is portrayed as a corrupt, hypocritical and 
dishonest politician taking advantage of his position in power.  
Liberal democracies always seem to involve some degree of pretense and hypocrisy. Therefore, 
the urge to blame one’s opponents for hypocrisy is almost irresistible for many political actors. As 
Judith Shklar argues: “It is easier to dispose of an opponent’s character by exposing his hypocrisy 
than to show his political convictions are wrong”.197 Effectively, for a professional politician it can 
be seen as the most hypocritical thing to accuse a rivaling politician of hypocrisy. In any case, it 
seems that pretense exists in both camps and therefore counter-attacks are to be expected. Memes, 
however, due to their anonymous and humorous nature, intend to stay above the presented issues 
and avoid overt political partisanship, which makes countering their allegations more difficult.  
Many of these meme images try to carefully reveal the interplay and incoherence between political 
frontstage and backstage. Frontstage is the forum where politicians announce their viewpoints, 
decisions and build a certain image of devotion and honorable intentions. Backstage is a more 
private space, where their real intentions and motives are being discussed in a relatively safe 
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environment, supposedly outside the reach of media.198 As Rajoy’s public image is generally more 
gentle and good-natured, by portraying Rajoy in an opposite way, these images often play with the 
discrepancy between the facade and with what really is happening behind the curtain. By 
questioning the coherence between these two political spheres, memes manage to stir up strong 
emotions. Hypocrisy appears as something utterly repulsive on a very basic level. Nobody likes 
being played for a fool and by suggesting that this is exactly what they (the politicians) have been 
doing, can be an effective strategy to turn people against them. To visualize my point, I will now 
give an example of such meme image.  
 
Figure 9: Rob me, Mariano! 
In this powerful image, a supposed PP supporter is pictured during a warm embrace with Mariano 
Rajoy. Captions give this person a voice, imagining he is saying ““Rob me, rob me, Mariano!! 
Rob everything I have!!” These captions totally change the nature of this picture. The citizen 
appears as he was part of a cult, being brainwashed by Rajoy and the surrounding people that now 
smile spitefully for having this person completely in their pockets. The accessories of the people 
around him (the official neckband of the person on the left and the bodyguard-style earphone of 
the person behind Rajoy) give an impression of them being party staff members. Rajoy’s gentle 
facial expression gives a hypocrite impression of him in this meme remix.  
The meme image most certainly refers to the numerous corruption scandals of the party (that I will 
discuss in more depth in the following subchapter), and to the fact that these scandals have not 
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stopped many people from voting for Rajoy and PP. The framing seems to be creating a people-
establishment division as the tanned skin (that can be a sign of outdoors labor) of this, more 
casually dressed man, contrasts with paleness and formal clothes of Rajoy and the surrounding 
people. The evil establishment is therefore taking advantage of the naïve people.  
Populism seeks to fix certain understandings of the relations of us (the people) and them (the 
establishment) to favor its own agenda.199 The Spanish meme imagery analyzed in this chapter 
intends to fix a notion, where the political elite is seen as hypocritical and looking for their own 
economic/political interest at the taxpayers’ expense. Propagating such understanding of social 
reality looks to incite antagonism and confrontation in a society and can deepen the chasm between 
the citizens and the establishment.  
This image seems to be asking the viewer if they want to be played for a fool or to choose 
otherwise. This perceived loss of dignity of an elderly citizen can stimulate affects and emotions, 
which by themselves are constitutive to social movements, as theorized by Eklundh.200 Memetic 
expressions of anger or frustration can create an experience of unity (since there are seemingly 
many others that share these feelings) and set an example of direction where to channel different 
affects. Spanish Indignados offers an excellent example, as even the name (Indignant ones) 
suggests the unifying factor being the feeling of indignancy that is directed towards the hypocrite 
power bloc.  
4.2 Gangster Rajoy 
The picture of a grave and even threatening-looking Rajoy is captioned 
with a sentence that says: “I have more friends in prison than Snoop Dogg 
and 2Pac together”.201 This image macro202 is unmistakably referring to 
the number of corruption cases exposed inside Rajoy’s People’s Party, 
which has resulted in many court cases and incarcerated high profile 
politicians of the party. In addition to that, Rajoy’s relatives have also had 
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problems with the law. Corruption scandals have been a major issue in many other Spanish 
political parties as well.  
In 2016, Transparency International estimated that Spain ranked second among the most corrupt 
countries in Western Europe, only Italy being more corrupt.203 Victor Lapuente Giné,  researcher 
of public administration and corruption, argues that administrations having a high number of 
public workers dependent on political appointment (i.e. on which party wins elections), are 
drastically more prone to corruption. In a middle-sized Spanish city (100 000-500 000 inhabitants) 
this number could be in hundreds, while in some of the least corrupted European cities of similar 
size, only 2 or 3 public workers, including the Mayor, are dependent on elections results.204 Manuel 
Villoria concludes that corruption is most prevalent on the municipal level, and emphasizes the 
issue of unchecked power of the mayors in terms of contracts for public works. He summarizes 
that there are several risky areas in Spanish local administrations and that institutional bodies to 
fight against corruption are clearly deficient. Additionally, Spain lacked a holistic and integrated 
anti-corruption strategy needed to tackle this problem. According to Eurobarometer 2013, only 27 
per cent of Spaniards believed that corruption is being combatted impartially.205  In the barometer 
of October 2016 (Rajoy swore in for his second term as Prime Minister in October 2016 as well) 
37.6 percent of the Spaniards responded that corruption and fraud are one of the three principal 
problems of the country presently. Only unemployment was estimated as a more important issue. 
Third most common answer was “politicians, political parties and politics in general” with 29.5 
percent.206 
This anti-establishment sentiment, frustration over perpetual corruption and general mistrust to 
politicians has been provoked and used by populist movements, most prominently Podemos, to 
build unity of their own anti-establishment alliances. Following Laclau’s ideas, as it seems that the 
two-party system has been unable to respond to this anti-corruption demand in any satisfactory 
way, it has found common solidarity and articulated into an equivalential relation with other social 
demands that were antagonistic towards the power bloc in Spanish politics. The crystallization of 
this process occurred in 15-M demonstrations. Podemos has aggressively tried to articulate this 
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resentment to its own populist chain of demands. The antagonistic relation of this anti-corruption 
demand and the political establishment has been reinforced by accusations against Rajoy of his 
ties to corruption. These accusations have taken various different forms ranging from public 
speeches of Podemos politicians to internet meme images associating Rajoy with corruption. These 
images try to propagate a notion, where instead of trying to tackle the corruption and satisfy this 
popular demand, Rajoy and perhaps all establishment politicians are in fact fostering the corruption 
and benefiting from it. Popularizing such understanding might have been especially damaging 
during the economic crisis, when strict cuts in public spending and increases in taxation worsened 
the quality of life particularly among the underprivileged. 
Recently, several high-profile politicians from the People’s Party have been sentenced in 
corruption trials. In 2018, former treasurer of the party Luis Bárcenas was sentenced for 33 years 
and 4 months in prison for different fiscal crimes.207 The Bárcenas case is connected to a larger 
corruption trial called the Gürtel case, in which 29 entrepreneurs and People’s Party politicians 
were condemned for fraud that cost at least 120 million euros of public funds.208 Additionally, the 
whole People’s Party was sentenced for institutionalized corruption and for keeping a slush fund 
from 1990 until 2009.209 The ex-President of the province of Castellón, Carlos Fabra, was also 
condemned for fiscal crimes in 2013.210 Another high-profile member of the party, the ex-President 
of the Balearic Islands, Jaume Matas, was condemned in a corruption trial known as the Palma 
Arena case.211  
Mariano Rajoy unquestionably has some party colleagues behind bars and many suspect that he 
was not completely unaware of the crimes committed by his subordinates (when he even himself 
benefited). Despite the seriousness of the topic, a juxtaposition makes the viewer laugh or grin, 
but our laughter in this particular case is clearly of the satirical type that includes a little wincing. 
Rajoy is being compared to two of the most notorious bad boys of popular music, gangsta rappers 
2Pac (or Tupac) and Snoop Dogg. Both have spent time in prison212 and Snoop Dogg has taken 
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part in illegal street gang activities.213 Nonetheless, what has boosted most their reputation as 
gangsters are their lyrics, often discussing crime, gang violence and drugs. While a huge number 
of People’s Party politicians are being accused in trials and jailed, the caption and Rajoy’s 
expression seem to be full of a gangsta rap attitude: Rajoy is swaggering about knowing a great 
number of prison inmates and taking a stern look in the camera, much in the style of rap album 
covers. There is a great contrast to Rajoy’s public “frontstage” image, in which he as a devoted 
and honest politician condemns the crimes of some of his party members and swears to not being 
aware of this illegal activity.214 By creating this contrast, the meme implies doubt about Rajoy’s 
sincerity. On top of that, the sinister expression on Rajoy’s face gives anything but innocent 
impression of him.  
This meme image pictures a humorous over-the-top version of Rajoy’s political “backstage”, 
which makes it laughable. Even though gangsta rappers tend to boast their notoriety and 
involvement in crime, politicians involved in corruption scandals or other white-collar crime do 
not usually brag about their criminal actions, quite the contrary, they usually try to assure the public 
about their innocence. This contrast is evidently due to their positions in hegemony and counter-
hegemony, which alter the perceptions of what kind of actions are justified. The voters expect 
politicians, entrusted with a position of authority, to work for the system and to be on the same 
side with law enforcement. Gangsta rappers, however, position themselves in the counter-
hegemony with their lyrics and many of their listeners can identify themselves with this position 
as well. They challenge and deconstruct the hegemonic statement that law enforcement and other 
government entities are honorable and respectable institutions by painting a picture of corrupted 
authorities and unjust treatment of inner city black communities.215 It is also claimed that rappers 
bring up many severe issues not sufficiently discussed in politics, and hence, expose contradictions 
inside the culture.216 From the counter-hegemonic perspective, the crimes against the oppressive 
hegemony do not appear as wrongdoing.  
This juxtaposition made between the two can also be interpreted to opinionate on that corporate 
crime should be seen as an equally condemnable deed as any other crime, and that the crime 
 
213 Toure, Rolling Stone 14.12.2006.  
214 Garea, El País 27.11.2014.  
215 Wheeler 2006, 78−79.  
216 Phillips, Los Angeles Times 19.7.1992.  
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committed by politicians, already in a favorable position in the society, should be less easily 
tolerated. Michel Foucault argues in his 1975 book Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 
that the modern penalty system, rather than aiming to take revenge on criminals or seek justice, 
intends to normalize the individuals that do not quite fit in the society. Penalties are not about 
fairness or justice, but instead they look to turn criminals into easily controlled law-abiding citizens 
that can function efficiently in the society.217 By following this thought, we understand how 
corporate crime is often more easily tolerated and how the sentences for such crimes tend to be 
shorter. In Spain for example, People’s Party has been unwilling to reform the penal code 
considering white-collar crime, although risks of impunity seem clear.218 These lawbreakers 
already seem to be fulfilling most of the expectations of the society. Their work is highly profitable, 
efficient and they possibly provide jobs for other citizens as well. Thus, in this logic, the 
normalizing corrections needed for such individuals are minor compared to most blue-collar 
criminals. Behind this lies an idea of a model citizen, for what every individual in the society 
should be striving. The notion, reproduced in this meme, where politicians are represented as 
felons, seems to be relatively frequently reinforced and repeated in Spanish meme imagery.  
Spanish political scandals have given a strong reason for voters to believe populist voices claiming 
that the establishment is deeply corrupted, dishonest and looking for their own benefit instead of 
the benefit of the majority of the citizens. In my view, for much of the Spanish population, this has 
become “common sense”. The meme imagery has been active in consolidating this understanding, 
while jesting and coming up with witty ways to express doubts about Rajoy’s innocence. Next 
meme images use a widely known double meaning in Castilian Spanish to challenge Rajoy’s 
version about his intimate circles.  
 
217 Foucault 1977, 177–184.  
218 PP was not willing to reform the minimum threshold for punishability for different white-collar crimes. For 
example, threshold of 120 000 euros for fiscal crimes and 500 000 euros for irregular financing of a political party 
were left untouched, despite the protests of the opposition; See eldiario.es, 21.1.2015.  
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Figure 12: People's Party chorizo 
Double meaning is another longstanding comedic device that has seen extensive use also in 
memetic internet content. In this particular meme image, Mariano Rajoy is pictured with an array 
of chorizos (traditional Spanish cured sausage) and with a caption, which states “Mariano Rajoy 
Brey219, family pictures”. In order to understand the joke, one has to be familiar with the colloquial 
double meaning of the word chorizo in Castilian Spanish. Apart from its denotation as food 
supplies, it has evolved to carry a connotative meaning of thief or crook. Spanish language is a 
great fusion of different influences. Apart from Latin, of which most lexicon derives, it has adopted 
vocabulary from Arabic (8% of the lexicon)220 and Basque221, for instance. In this particular case, 
the double meaning of chorizo is adopted to Castilian Spanish from Romany language Caló, in 
which chorar means “to steal”, and chori means “a thief”.222 This shows just how culture specific 
memetic images can be. Apart from using the Spanish language, and thus excluding the non-
Spanish speakers, it also utilizes a double meaning particularly used in Castilian Spanish. In Latin 
American Spanish, chorizo also sometimes holds a double entendre, but in this case usually with 
a connotation to male sexual organs.223  
 
219 This includes his paternal and maternal family names according to Spanish naming customs. 
220 Martínez Egido 2007, 15–16.  
221 Dworkin 2012, 26–27.  
222 MLA: Álvarez, Javier. «Etimología de la palabra «chorizo» como sinónimo de «ladrón»». delcastellano.com. 26 
de mayo de 2011. Web. 2 de febrero de 2017. 
223 Wordreference.com. Forums. Chorizo (connotación sexual). 2010−2016.  
Figure 11: Family of chorizos 
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Therefore, this meme image seems to be trying to propagate an understanding, where Rajoy’s 
family (probably himself included) is seen as criminal. The scandals caused by Rajoy’s relatives 
are crucial when interpreting this meme image. One of his cousins was condemned for 15 years 
and 6 months in prison for hijacking.224 Another cousin, a physicist from the University of Seville, 
was involved in a scandal when in 2007 Rajoy referred to him when stating that climate change is 
not a major global problem.225 Rajoy’s brother was also fined for refusing to sign registers in his 
position as a registrar.226 Mariano Rajoy used to speak very highly about his family, especially 
about his grandfather who had a major role in the Galicianist movement during the Second 
Republic of Spain.227 Meme imagery tried to attack him from every possible angle.  
The second image is another version of how this double meaning can be deployed to question the 
authorities’ innocence. Chorizo slices are equipped with a logo of the People’s Party to imply that 
the party is rotten to the core. The images in this subchapter were circulating around the internet 
already in 2016 (probably even much earlier), when I collected them and it turned out that the 
memes were on to something as the People’s Party was condemned of running a slush fund in 
2018. It was also declared that the corruption was organized and institutionalized inside the party. 
The repetitive propagation of this understanding of Rajoy, his inner circles and party colleagues, 
alongside with court orders backing such interpretation, has severely affected Rajoy’s public 
image.  
4.3 Rajoy and Hipsters  
In this subchapter, we witness an interesting example of a discursive struggle over hegemonic 
articulations regarding animal protection and the cause of the youth. The People’s Party has been 
trying to figure out ways to make themselves look more persuasive in the eyes of the young voters, 
who are largely attracted to the more recent additions in the Spanish political spectrum as can be 
seen in the following chart. In the December 2015 elections, the left-wing populist Podemos, had 
proportionally much more support among voters between 18 and 34 years of age, while PP seemed 
to connect extremely well with the voters over 65 years old. The chart shows that Ciudadanos were 
also relatively successful among younger generations.  
 
224 Espinosa, El País 7.4.2011; La Voz de Galicia 8.4.2011. 
225 El País 22.10.2007.  
226 El Mundo 24.6.2008.  
227 Carbajo, El País 17.6.2006.  
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228 
Before the elections of December 2015, the People’s Party launched a television advertisement 
that was clearly directed towards young voters. The video was titled “Think without Prejudices – 
Hipsters”.  It portrays a group of young people of which one, a vegan who spends his summers by 
saving whales and goes to work by bicycle, explains the others his reasons why he is going to vote 
for the People’s Party. He explains that the economic policy of the People’s Party has proved 
efficient and that Rajoy does not have anything against the whales. As green values seem to be 
increasingly widespread among the population, PP wants to emphasize that this is not something 
they oppose. The advertisement ends with captions saying: “We are the most voted party because 
many different kinds of people vote for us”.229 With this slogan PP seems to reassure that it is able 
to respond satisfactorily to the demands of “different kinds of people”.  
 
Why would PP consider it important to emphasize how young, environmentally conscious people 
also vote for the party? Young adults were the most affected group by the economic crisis and 
have had difficulties in accessing the job market during the slow recovery.230 By looking at the 
 
228 Results among different age groups in the December 2015 elections; Bayón, La Voz de Asturias 31.5.2016 (CIS 
Abril 2016). 
229 Youtube 2015. Piensa Sin Prejuicios – Hipsters.   
230 Pérez Camarrero 2013, 77–80. 
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chart above (as well as results from many other elections since the economic crisis), we notice that 
the difficulties faced by young adults have translated into significant dissatisfaction towards the 
traditional ruling parties (PP and PSOE). Populist voices, especially on the left, have addressed 
these groups and encouraged their indignation towards the political establishment by highlighting 
its inability or unwillingness to fix these problems. As Moffitt argues, spectacularizing the failures 
of the establishment to respond to different social demands in order to propagate a sense of a crisis 
is in the heart of the populist style.231 As the perception of the existence of multiple unmet social 
demands is crucial for populism,232 PP seems to be trying to counter such perception and address 
these demands individually to avoid polarization in the society.  
 
PP’s campaign tries to undermine the perception, in which its policies are understood to be 
damaging for the environment. As environmental protection policies are increasingly important 
especially for many young adults, few political parties can ignore them. However, especially many 
left-wing parties have worked to identify themselves as the green choice and Spanish left is not an 
exception. Stuart Hall explains how certain ideological elements can, under certain conditions, 
cohere together within discourse and become articulated to certain political subjects.233 The 
articulation between green values and left-wing identities (an ongoing project of many left-wing 
parties already since the so-called Eurocommunism) needs a constitutive outside. As populist 
articulations involve an antagonist, Rajoy, who, backed by his physicist cousin, had belittled the 
threat of climate change234, was put in this role by Podemos politicians and other populist actors.235 
PP’s institutionalist logic of difference attempts to impede this process. The logic of difference 
seeks to provide a more complex picture of the relations of individuals in the society in order to 
make it more difficult to create a clear antagonistic frontier. According to Laclau and Mouffe, this 
could be done through a “differential absorption of demands”, with an intention to segregate them 
from the popular chain of equivalences and transform them into objective differences within the 
system, which would result in a collapse of the populist coalition between unmet societal 
demands.236 Therefore, confrontation and antagonism are crucial for the populist chain of 
 
231 Moffitt 2016, 131-132.  
232 Laclau 2005, 73; 89; 177.  
233 Hall 1996, 141-142.  
234 See: subchapter 4.2.  
235 See for example Heraldo 5.6.2018.   
236 Gürhanlı 2018, 58; Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 129–130.  
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equivalence to stay intact. The PP’s ad seems to question the simplified antagonistic relation of 
the particular demands of animal rights or environmentalism with the policies of Rajoy’s 
administration.  
As Laclau points out, the process through which this relatively fixed articulation of the 
equivalential chain could be debilitated or broken is, of course, long and complex. Stuart Hall notes 
when commenting on Laclau’s and Mouffe’s work that, even though, theoretically anything can 
be de-articulated or re-articulated, the historical forces, which have discursively produced the 
present, continue to function as constraints on discursive articulation.237 Thus, it is not a simple 
process to de-articulate green values from the leftist identities. In this particular case, the groups 
demanding environmental protection should feel under-represented or severely asphyxiated 
between other demands in the chain, in order for them to be absorbed by the institutional system.238 
Podemos, which could be interepreted as the main carrier of the equivalential chain that has 
articulated these demands, is part of the green left group (GUE/NGL) in the European Parliament 
and environmental demands and marine conservation in particular, were present in the programs 
of the party. However, one could make an argument that they were not as visible as some of the 
central demands, such as ending austerity or corruption.239 In such a polarized situation, the 
possibilities for blurring the dichotomic frontier and/or the rearrangement of the political 
imaginary in any major way with such a campaign seemed very unlikely from the start. On top of 
that, social media users started a multimodal rejection of the de-articulation attempt of the PP’s 
campaign.  
 
 
237 Hall 1996, 148. 
238 Laclau 2005, 131–138.  
239 Podemos 2014 Documento Final del Programa Colaborativo; Podemos 2019 Programa de Podemos.  
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Figure 13: Hipster and whales  
As seen in the memetic collage tweeted by the Greenpeace of Spain, meme imagery was also used 
to engage in this hegemonic struggle and to reinforce the antagonistic relation between PP and the 
demands regarding animal protection. The caption states, “The hipster of PP has good intentions 
but is not very well informed”. The collage contains a screen capture of the campaign video, where 
“the hipster” says: “as far as I know, Rajoy does not have anything against the whales”. A news 
article about PP rejecting a sanctuary for the whales on Canary Islands, a decision that was taken 
just couple of months earlier, was added in the collage to prove the hypocrisy behind this 
statement.240 Twitter users shared this news story actively after the campaign of PP was launched. 
The campaign video was also heavily voted down by YouTube users (almost 90 per cent of the 
votes were negative). Comments ranged from pure mockery (often using Rajoy’s catchphrases that 
I discussed in chapter 3) to questioning how a vegan could vote for a party that support bullfights. 
Some even expressed strong disbelief over if the PP seriously thought the ad would convince 
anyone and suspected it being a joke.  
 
240 La Vanguardia 7.10.2015; eldiario.es, 7.10.2015.  
62 
 
 
 
What about the People’s Party’s appeal to the youth? Shortly after PP released the campaign video, 
Rajoy tweeted a photo of him with a young person and a caption that says: “Very different kinds 
of people vote for us #TheHipstersToo. Trust him @People’s Party, #WithoutPrejudices. For you. 
For everyone.” In this catch-all attempt, Rajoy suggests that this bearded supporter beside him 
would be part of the so-called hipster subculture (a heterogeneous group of people that look for 
authenticity, alternative trends and are usually characterized as having liberal values). Rajoy’s 
tweet intends to offer a proof about the great variety of profiles of their voters, as even the 
postmodern youth support them. Twitter users immediately started posting skeptical comments 
about the campaign of the People’s Party with its own hashtag #TambienLosHipsters (the hipsters 
too) and seemed to be blaming the People’s Party for fabrication and opportunism.241  
PP’s strategists seem worried about their poor success among young voters. In Laclauian terms, 
we can see the campaign of the PP to interfere in the system of equivalences articulated by the 
populist actors in the society. These voices have effectively targeted the young voters that were 
largely dissatisfied with the political establishment and its capacity to satisfy their demands. To 
spectacularize this perceived “crisis of representation”, populist actors intended to build an 
understanding where the interests of the youth were incompatible with the policies of the 
 
241 Twitter. #TambienLosHipsters; at first many tweets were simply arguing that a beard does not prove that one is a 
hipster. 
Figure 14: Rajoy and hipster Figure 15: Rajoy and Iglesias 
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establishment parties and especially PP, which would ultimately help them to articulate these 
demands to their own chain of equivalence. This understanding is, of course, only partially fixed 
in a specific conjuncture and can potentially be rearranged through discursive struggle. In his 
seminal work On Populist Reason, Laclau offers an example of how in the US during the decades 
after the Second World War, right-wing populism engaged in a successful struggle over popular 
signifiers in relation to “the cause of the small man” or “average Joe/average American”.242 These 
ideological elements were once strongly articulated to the New Deal/Democratic Party-camp in 
1930s but had been abandoned and under-represented for years. Cementing the articulation 
between the new right and the aforementioned popular identities paved the way for Nixon and 
Reagan (and arguably Trump) presidencies.243  
People Party’s online campaign intends to disrupt by using the logic of difference. It intends to 
complexify the social (hashtag many different kinds of people vote for us) and oppose a simplified 
understanding where the interests of the youth are conflicting with the policies of PP. This tweet 
seems to be reassuring that as “even the hipsters are supporting us; there is no reason to believe 
that we are not working for the youth”. As a response, Spanish internet users took various different 
actions to forestall the de-articulation attempt.  
Soon after the picture was published on Twitter, information about this “hipster”, found on his 
Twitter and Facebook accounts, propagated on the net. The material shows the “hipster”, who was 
uncovered as a member of the youth organization of the party and a town councilor, to be an 
enthusiast of traditional religious celebrations (El Rocío and The Holy Week) and bullfights. He 
had also re-tweeted a post of the Greek fascist party Golden Dawn. After the users on social media 
started sharing information and memetic responses on Rajoy’s tweet, traditional media carried the 
story as well244, which exemplifies the flow of information in the hybrid media system. The whole 
fuss over this fabrication took place in December 2015, during the most frantic campaigning for 
the elections held that same month.  
 
242 These signifiers refer to the large, white working class that the Democratic Party seemed to have forgotten when 
focusing on securing the votes of the ethnic minorities. 
243 Laclau 2005, 133–138; Here he refers to the group of voters that are sometimes also called the “Reagan 
democrats”.  
244 See for example El Periódico 9.12.2015, El Confidencial 8.12.2015, Bengoa, El País 9.12.2015.  
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Typically to internet culture, the users started to produce re-mixes of the picture and to utilize 
meme images (such as Rajoy with a “hipster style” beard and glasses) to create a collective critical 
response to the perceived fabrication. My other example is a remix of Rajoy’s tweet, where the 
face of the “hipster” has been replaced with the face of the Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias and a 
caption that now states that also the “reds” (read: leftists) vote for the People’s Party. This has 
been done to create an absurd, carnivalesque, situation in order to signal that users were aware of 
the aforementioned fabrication and to even further reinforce the understanding of a conflict 
between the ambiguous interests of the youth and the policies of PP. The carnival sense of the 
world, which brings together the unlikeliest of people and everything that would normally be 
separated, is, according to Mikhail Bakhtin, “opposed to that one-sided and gloomy official 
seriousness which is dogmatic and hostile to evolution and change, which seeks to absolutize a 
given condition of existence or a given social order”. In carnival, any eccentric occurrence, such 
as Iglesias joining forces with Rajoy, is possible.245 The meme responses to the #TheHipstersToo 
tweet suggest that, with such a far-fetched claim, Rajoy declared a carnival to begin and that 
everyone was encouraged to join in and create their own, equally absurd versions. 
Like some other examples analyzed in this study, this image seems to understand Iglesias and 
Podemos as the main carriers of the populist chain of equivalence that aims to challenge the 
political establishment. We can analyze Pablo Iglesias here as an empty signifier that condenses 
different demands by symbolizing the whole populist chain of equivalence. Through his TV talk 
shows (La Tuerka and Fort Apache) Iglesias intentionally looked to attain this position as the voice 
for the victims of the economic crisis by taking their side against the elites. When Podemos was 
formed, voters did not know about the party, but what they knew was that “the guy with the 
ponytail” defending the people on TV was taking part in the elections. Iglesias was pictured in 
Podemos’ communication as “a normal person like you”, and therefore, someone who could 
defend the interests of the ordinary citizens.246 The perception that Iglesias’ rise to power would 
be a solution for multiple different grievances, for example, free university education, stopping 
evictions and ending corruption, unifies these otherwise heterogeneous elements. Since the whole 
articulation of the populist chain, which Iglesias as an empty signifier symbolizes, would be 
 
245 Bakhtin 1984, 122, 130, 160.  
246 Sanders, Molina Hurtado & Zoragastua 2017.  
65 
 
unimaginable without the antagonism towards Rajoy, the absurdity of this comparison aims to 
ridicule Rajoy’s portrayal of his electorate.  
While there probably are people in the ambiguous group of hipsters that voted for the People's 
Party, the party seemed to fail miserably in finding one that can be deemed authentic in the eyes 
of the online public. As a preventive strategy against the de-articulation attempt, the online 
counter-campaign made sure to signal that they were aware of the fabrication. The internet users 
tried to hold the party accountable for its claims and reveal signs of hypocrisy, manipulation or 
simply ignorance about the contemporary youth culture. Young voters were most likely the 
primary target group of the advertisement and Rajoy’s tweet and instead of improving the image 
of the party among the youth, it ended up suffering another loss of authenticity and reliability.  
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4. Memes against Austerity 
4.1 Memes, Democracy and Populism 
By going through meme imagery featuring Mariano Rajoy, one notices that a significant number 
of memes seem to be targeting his unpopular austerity measures. This criticism coincides with the 
central demands of the Spanish left-wing populism at the time. What stood out in the meme 
material was the tendency to portray Rajoy as a puppet or other submissive figure controlled by 
neoliberal forces. By suggesting that Rajoy is under the control of the economic elites or the EU, 
memes are already setting their sights on a new, fundamental enemy beyond Rajoy and his 
government. Having an antagonistic relation towards a common adversary is crucial for a populist 
chain of equivalences to stay intact. Therefore, outlining a new opponent, in case the battle against 
Rajoy is won, is important for the firmness and longevity of the equivalential chain. Unlike in the 
meme images in the previous chapter, Rajoy is generally not portrayed as evil. He is rather shown 
as a suggestible and submissive politician, who is helpless in the face of challenges and in the 
hands of others that try to persuade him. The final and ultimate battle of the populist movement 
will be fought against a greater adversary that is the undemocratic neoliberal system.  
As discussed earlier in this study, populism has an important role in the political meme 
phenomenon and the previous strategies show clear signs of populist tendencies as well. Ernesto 
Laclau’s theory of populism is particularly useful for understanding how memes can function as 
political, discursive tools. As I explain already in the introduction, Laclau sees populism as a logic 
of articulation that unites individuals and groups with heterogeneous social demands and finally 
forms a collective subject, which highlights common antagonism towards a perceived adversary.247  
Laclau’s academic collaborator Chantal Mouffe, and the former political secretary of Podemos, 
Íñigo Errejón conclude that the underlying reason for recent populist emergence in different parts 
of the world is post-politics experienced in post-democratic societies, in which the demands of the 
people are not represented by the traditional political channels, i.e. the centre left-wing and right-
wing parties. Instead, they seem to be advancing the exact same policies.248 This has been evident 
on various occasions throughout Spanish political history. Scholars have argued that the distinction 
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248 Errejón & Mouffe 2015, 84–90.  
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between PP and PSOE has narrowed considerably.249 Both socialist party Prime Ministers before 
Pedro Sánchez: José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Felipe González250 have been accused of 
advancing neoliberal policies despite representing the supposed left of the political spectrum. 
PSOE has been seen to moderate its ideological stances whenever it was needed to broaden its 
electoral base.251 Additionally, Zapatero’s response to the economic crisis was bowing to the 
political pressure by the European Central Bank and imposing large cuts in government spending 
in 2010.252 According to Errejón and Mouffe, in such circumstances a populist rupture could take 
place.253  
Memes, I argue, can take different functions and work in different stages in a populist rupture. 
However, to comprehensively study memes as populist communication we should analyze them 
in relation with other populist signifying acts and the bigger picture of a social movement that 
forms a large communicational mosaic, which articulates different demands to a populist chain of 
equivalence and looks to construct a new political subjectivity. As Hatakka argues, in the 
contemporary hybrid media system, in addition to the articulations made by populist leaders, 
grassroots online negotiations affect what kind of demands and ideas populist identities end up 
articulating.254 Memes are a form of communication that is commonly used in political online 
negotiations. Due to their simplistic form, they rarely provide any plausible plan to solve the 
problems they intend to highlight. Despite this, they can intrigue the crowds to challenge the 
establishment collectively, which can result in a radical reorganization of the political field or force 
the power bloc to perform desired social changes. These challenges can also demand the 
establishment to give well-grounded reasons for their actions and hence animate the dialogue 
between different groups.255  
In order to understand criticism in the online context, a glance should be taken at the simultaneous 
political upheavals outside the internet. Jenkins observes that media tactics and messages move 
fluidly between offline and online forms and that street protesters find each other online, share 
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techniques and use photos taken in offline demonstrations to continue activism online.256 In May 
2011, the protests of the Indignados would take the streets in 50 Spanish cities. Various social 
demands were presented and linkages between them were starting to emerge in these massive 
demonstrations. New people with new demands were brought to these events, mostly informed 
and encouraged via internet.257 Later in 2014, Podemos was founded with an intention to create an 
organizational vehicle for these diverse popular grievances. As Laclau argues, populist unification 
in any imaginable situation takes place on a radically heterogeneous social terrain, and therefore, 
effective glue to stick these elements together is fundamental. In the Spanish context, empty 
signifiers, such as “la casta”258, democracy or “el pueblo”259, were used to articulate these 
differential elements. Later on, Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias, seemed to become a unifying 
signifier for these demands. Additionally, as Laclau points out, some specific demands in the chain 
of equivalence may achieve centrality and come to represent a greater end and the totality of the 
set of demands of the movement.260 In the case of Podemos and many other Southern European 
leftist populists, the central demands were arguably revolving around ending austerity and stopping 
corruption.  
I have observed that many political memes commenting Mariano Rajoy bear similarities with the 
demands and stances of the Indignados movement and Podemos, and thus it is impossible to 
separate the online and offline movements criticizing the elites (casta) and the system. Some meme 
images even seem to openly advocate Pablo Iglesias and Podemos as an institutional channel to 
express this indignation. As Costanza-Chocks suggests, transmedia mobilization views media as a 
part of social movement formation. Media is not simply serving as a platform for messaging, but 
also for strengthening identity formation and affecting the possible outcomes.261  
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5.2 Mariano Scissorhands  
When examining some of the most profound changes in the Spanish society in the last ten years, 
most of them seem to be linked with the economic crisis that started in 2008. The crisis had 
devastating economic, social and political consequences. The social and economic problems have 
caused discontentment and social conflict. Spanish politicians have often blamed the global 
financial crisis for the recession in Spain, but domestic components such as unsustainable growth 
of the real estate sector and immoderate spending have been named as some of the main causes 
for the crisis to cause Spain such devastation. 262 Rajoy’s government imposed tax raises and 
spending cuts in education, health, pensions and social services. The difficult decisions made by 
politicians in power evidently left an abundance of social demands unmet and citizens dissatisfied.  
Highlighting the failures of the establishment to answer to a growing number of grievances was 
not only a powerful strategy for the opposition, but also made these demands more accessible for 
a populist movement to articulate in its chain of equivalence and accuse the political establishment 
of not working for “the people”.  
This meme image utilizes an allusion commonly used when 
discussing the welfare cuts and other austerity measures. 
Scissors are often being used as an easily understandable 
symbol of cutting. The juxtaposition between Edward 
Scissorhands and politicians prescribing austerity measures 
seems to be a particularly fertile thematic for meme imagery. 
There are dozens of different images combining Rajoy with 
scissors. The former Prime Minister of Finland Juha Sipilä, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the former President of 
the Generalitat of Catalonia Artur Mas, among others, have 
been pictured as the main character of the Tim Burton film 
as well.  
Mariano Rajoy is pictured as a messy-haired and scissor-handed Edward, with a downhearted 
expression on his face. There are several things written in Spanish on the blades of the scissors. 
Some of them discuss the cuts or other austerity measures performed by his government, while 
 
262 Royo 2013, 213–215.  
Figure 16: Mariano Scissorhands 
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others blame him for fraudulent policies. The image presents “moscosos” and “paga extra” as some 
of the things Rajoy has touched with his scissors. “Moscosos” are additional holidays of certain 
public servants and workers.263 “Paga extra” refers to an additional salary of two weeks, which 
workers receive usually twice a year, in July and December.264 These were some of the old benefits 
Rajoy revoked in 2012 in order to reduce the budget deficit. These actions caused major discontent 
especially among public servants and finally before the 2015 elections Rajoy promised to restore 
extra holidays (moscosos) and also partly the additional paychecks (paga extra).265 “Laborización” 
is linked with these actions and refers to an act of applying private sector workers’ legislation to 
public servants, who have had a special legislative status in Spain.266  
Some of the blades represent controversial remedies of the government to solve the problem of 
competitiveness. Despite their earlier promises, after winning the elections the People’s Party 
government facilitated the dismissals by lowering their costs to the companies (that were higher 
than in most European countries), and also froze the salaries, which, due to inflation, caused 
Spaniards to have weaker spending power in the following years. This deterioration of workers’ 
rights resulted in many forms of resistance, such as massive demonstrations in the major cities, a 
general strike of the workers’ unions on March 29th 2012 and it also seems to be an important topic 
in the meme images on the internet.267 The image also claims that Rajoy gives leadership position 
for his friends. Rajoy is being accused of “choriceo”, stealing, which he and his intimate circles 
were accused of in the memes examined in the previous chapter as well.  
This meme image presents Rajoy as Edward Scissorhands of the film of Tim Burton by the same 
name. In the film, Edward, played by Johnny Depp, is a creation of a scientist and has been living 
in an old mansion, isolated from the rest of the world. He is characterized by having a kind-hearted 
and harmless nature, very little knowledge about the world outside the mansion and scissors 
instead of hands. A woman finds him alone in the mansion and brings him to a quiet suburban 
community nearby. He is first received in the community with eager curiosity. Despite his 
benevolent intentions, he is not equipped with “common sense” of this new environment. His 
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scissors, which he sometimes uses in a sloppy manner, causing harm to himself and to others, in 
addition to his misunderstood gentleness, often get him into trouble in the community.268 
This portrays Rajoy and his austerity measures in a very humorous light. The simplest 
interpretation would be that it wants to show Rajoy as a character with a tendency to cut things, 
such as social benefits. All the same, I argue that it also endeavors to picture Rajoy as a very 
awkward handler of his scissors (austerity measures). The sincerity and benevolence of the original 
character combined with the downcast and melancholic expression on Rajoy’s face implies the 
inadvertence of his action; he has managed to destroy some of the workers’ rights due to his clumsy 
and ill-starred ways with the scissors or perhaps because someone else incited him to do so. This 
allusion can be interpreted to imply that Rajoy did not fully understand the consequences of his 
actions and did all the damage just because of his confusion and lack of judgement in the new 
environment, which in original Edward’s case was the suburban community, but in Rajoy’s case, 
the position of the Prime Minister after almost eight years as the leader of the opposition.269  
Another more winged interpretation could be that the meme image makes a juxtaposition between 
Rajoy’s coming to power and Edward’s arrival to the community. Edward arrives from a dark and 
isolated mansion (Rajoy’s time as the leader of the opposition) to the community. People receive 
him with excitement and he becomes popular among the neighbors (Rajoy and People’s Party 
taking a historical victory in the 2011 elections and sensationally getting a majority in the 
Parliament).270 Edward helps the neighbors with his trimming skills, but falls out of favor with 
most members of the community because of various unfortunate events, as did Rajoy and the 
People’s Party in terms of the number of votes in the 2015 elections. Partly because of the strict 
austerity measures and the ongoing economic crisis, Rajoy’s People’s Party lost more than 3.5 
million votes between the elections of 2011 and 2015. Rajoy finally had to leave politics after a 
motion of no confidence in 2018.   
These perceptions of Rajoy may be beneficial for a populist mobilization. By combining Laclau’s 
and Moffitt’s theories, I suggest that populism typically tries to propagate a perception of a crisis 
of the establishment and of its ability to respond to social demands of the citizens.271 Images in 
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this chapter intend to spectacularize the failures of the establishment to satisfy people’s needs and 
demands, and to propagate an understanding of Rajoy’s lacking ability and determination to meet 
the expectations and grievances of the people. Such understanding makes these demands look for 
political alternatives and, I would argue, makes them more easily articulable to a new populist 
identity. As Rajoy is pictured as a culprit for all these grievances, opposition to him weaves them 
together. 
In December 2011, Mariano Rajoy started as Prime Minister in a very complicated economic 
situation. The government had to find solutions to some profound economic problems such as the 
excessive deficit of the budget and the extremely high unemployment rate, which at that time was 
at 22.9 percent but peaked at 26.3 percent in February 2013. Therefore, one could argue that this 
image succumbs to the temptation of demagoguery and takes advantage of these easy targets of 
critique without offering any suggestion of alternative operations model. Bringing up these 
grievances can, however, stimulate the discussion around these issues and, consequently, give the 
society a push towards change. As I will explain later in this chapter, imagining alternatives for 
austerity policies within limits of the rigid European Economic Area restrictions was a difficult 
task for the crisis economies.  
5.3 “All Politicians Are the Same” 
As we have seen in the previous subchapter, the online meme culture has come up with creative 
ways to criticize Mariano Rajoy. However, many images in my material seemed to be channeling 
these grievances to the whole political system. The online meme imagery pictured a broken 
system, where Rajoy and other top politicians, despite their campaign promises, are all eventually 
practicing policies that solely benefit the elite. These images repeat a discourse that was common 
in many Western European countries, where differences between the main parties were so small 
that it did not matter who you voted for. This was also the message of the Indignados as the 
movement largely took an anti-system stance and encouraged abstention, spoiling of votes or 
voting for one of the smaller parties.272 
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Figure 17: Rajoy and Zapatero 
Figure 17 exemplifies a memetic configuration of the common “all politicians are the same”-
discourse and provides a rather serious comparison that continues with grievances related to 
austerity measures. This time Rajoy’s austerity measures are compared with grievances against the 
policies implemented by the previous Prime Minister, José Luis Zapatero of the Socialist Party. 
Rajoy is often portrayed in diverse relations with other politicians, which I will discuss later in this 
chapter. This image is composed of grievances against both ex-Prime Ministers and asks the reader 
to “find differences between Zapatero and Rajoy”. We can analyze this image as a populist 
discursive act aiming to build an understanding, where the system is not offering any options for 
austerity policies and, therefore, fails to work for the people.  
This suggested systemic error has been addressed by various theorists in the recent years. Chantal 
Mouffe and one of the founding members of Podemos, Íñigo Errejón, suggest in their co-authored 
book, that the underlying reason for the current wave of populism is the state of politics, which 
Mouffe calls “post-political”, in which the demands of the people are not represented by any of 
the traditional parties. In most of Western Europe, the problem with the old social democratic and 
liberal-conservative parties is that they are seemingly advancing the exact same policies under 
different slogans.273 Mouffe argues that in this post-political situation, all those who oppose the 
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consensus of the center, which follows the neoliberal dogma, are disqualified by calling them 
extremists or populists. In this context, Mouffe also observes erosion of democratic ideals such as 
popular sovereignty and equality. In Spain, 15-M “Indignados” largely used the language of 
democracy in their protest and the shortcomings of democratic institutions were in the center of 
their grievances and slogans such as “We have a vote but we do not have a voice” or “Real 
democracy now”.274 In a similar manner, in a 2014 speech Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias 
highlighted the marginal differences between PP and PSOE. As he was holding Coca Cola and 
Pepsi Cola cans in his hands, he suggested that the establishment parties, much like the soft drinks, 
were in essence both the same, despite looking different from the outside.275 Along the lines of 
these voices, meme imagery seems to suggest that voting as a democratic method of decision-
making has become pointless, as the system does not offer any real alternatives. The desperation 
of the Spaniards seems to be in line with this notion as, according to a survey made by Fundación 
Foessa in 2017, 75 per cent of Spaniards believed that their social and economic situation cannot 
be changed by voting.276  
A similar development has been observed by Cas Mudde as he sees that the reasons behind the 
populist surge was the common agenda of the traditional European parties. This meant in most 
cases the European integration through the European Union, multiethnic societies and neoliberal 
economic policies. Implementation of neoliberal programs, for instance New Public Management 
that brings modes of action from the private sector to public administrations, have made national 
governments more vulnerable for interventions from corporations and international organizations 
such as the EU. Practices that follow this logic, such as austerity, were not sufficiently debated. 
Issues such as austerity and immigration were depoliticized and portrayed as necessary or 
inevitable.277 Mudde blames the traditional parties for practicing “undemocratic liberal policies” 
and demand them to heed the call and bring real, coherent alternatives to the table. He explicates 
how, for example, in the United Kingdom and Germany the left developed business-friendly 
attitudes and the right moved towards more pragmatic approaches in economic and cultural 
issues.278 The same trends can clearly be observed in Spanish party politics. Neoliberalization and 
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alternation between center-left and center-right parties, revolving doors between administration 
and corporations, robust corruption, increasing irresponsiveness of political elites to social 
demands, rising disaffection of popular majorities with representative democracy and 
demobilization of citizens, have been some of the negative phenomena in the Spanish democracy 
since the democratic transition until the Indignados movement.279  
Wendy Brown suggests that neoliberalism has become a political rationality, i.e., a hegemonic, 
normative form of reason. Brown draws on Michel Foucault’s persistent idea of how “truth” and 
knowledge are deeply tied to power. By basing its arguments in scientifically produced knowledge 
(mostly by economists), neoliberal ideology has created a hegemonic political culture, in which 
other forms of reasoning are seen as either radical, populist or utterly unthinkable.280 Neoliberal 
logic establishes a set of so-called “best practices” that are portrayed as objective, neutral and free 
of any political ideology and can only be contested by better practices, not by objections to what 
they promulgate. In this logic, there are no real options for the current economic doctrine; there 
are only good and bad policies.281 This reasoning seems to have influenced Rajoy’s and Zapatero’s 
responses to the economic crisis. However, as the meme imagery suggests, it left some Spaniards 
with a sentiment of lost popular sovereignty, which encouraged protests and populist voices that 
promised to bring in an alternative that would answer the needs of the citizens that felt abandoned 
by the neoliberal system.  
As Yannis Stavrakakis argues, the anti-populist logic, followed by most parties in the consensual 
center, intentionally or unintentionally marginalizes the existing unsatisfied demands and 
grievances that exist in the society. It reduces politics to mere administration and rejects 
fundamental democratic elements of popular participation and deliberation. The logic suggests that 
the expertise of the supposedly objective technocrats, such as central bankers, will provide better 
outcomes.282 In Spanish Twitter communication, PP and Ciudadanos have used anti-populist 
discourse by framing populism (of Podemos) as a disaster, threat or danger to democracy. 
Populism is also represented as a temptation that should be defeated and as having close ties to 
“criminals” like Chavez and Maduro in Venezuela (to which Spanish left-wing populists are often 
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compared in order to discredit them). Negative emotions such as fear were evoked with these 
tweets. PSOE politicians used the keyword “populism” exclusively in relation to Brexit.283 PSOE-
leader Pedro Sánchez, however, has branded Podemos populist, when seeing much of the PSOE 
electorate moving to the Podemos camp.284        
A good example of a foreclosure of the popular sovereignty and argumentation of the “best 
practices”, are the austerity policy measures that are discussed by memes in this chapter. Rajoy 
defended these practices by framing them essential and imperative to lift the country from 
economic recession and said he had no choice, despite the fact, that he does not like the 
measures.285 In other words, Rajoy was presenting objective “best practices” and not something 
that could be politically contested. By doing this, Rajoy leaves no room for deliberation over other 
possible remedies for the economic problems. The memes in question are posing a challenge for 
the understanding of the austerity measures that Rajoy is trying to consolidate. Such confrontations 
and shakings on the field of meanings can affect the political outcomes.286 Shifts in the meaning 
of austerity measures and over their necessity, can affect how administration can implement them. 
Whether the support for the administration takes a hit or not, depends largely on what meanings 
citizens give to the policy measures.  
I see these meme images as a part of the movement that triggered a shift in the Spanish political 
culture. This movement tried to push an understanding, where political and economic elites were 
culprits of the crisis and the political divide between the ordinary people and the political and 
economic establishments overshadows the traditional left/right division.287 This discursive work 
revolved around the Indignados-movement and occurred in both online and offline contexts. In 
fact, most of the people stated that they heard about the movement on the internet and that the most 
relevant information was available in an online environment. Interestingly, 80 percent of the 
Spaniards considered 15-M causes as just and legitimate.288 Memes were part of the discussion 
that took place on the internet and functioned as an easy way to engage in public deliberation about 
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the issues presented by the participants of the 15-M movement. As this deliberation involved a 
heterogeneous group of people with different concerns, the discursive practices of the movement, 
including meme imagery, tried to weave these elements together and construct a new horizon for 
these previously separated grievances. 
5.4 Francoist Establishment and a New Hope 
After the rise of Ciudadanos and Podemos, two newcomers in the highest level of Spanish politics, 
the internet meme imagery was active in commenting their relation to Rajoy and his 
administration. While one finds various different portrayals in the online meme material, 
Ciudadanos was often represented as a slightly updated version of PP at most. The former 
Ciudadanos leader Albert Rivera was pictured as an arm-bearer or secret lover of Rajoy. However, 
Podemos and its leader Pablo Iglesias were pictured in a different manner. They were mostly 
pictured as something clearly different from the old establishment, both in good and bad. With the 
following images I aim to give visual examples of these common tendencies in the online meme 
material.  
 
Figure 18: Francoist establishment 
Figure 18 is what seems to be an election poster from which several layers are ripped off. It appears 
that behind Ciudadanos’ ex-leader Albert Rivera’s poster, underlying layers reveal Rajoy’s face 
as well as PSOE’s poster. Yet another layer shows a military hat with Francoist symbols. Despite 
Figure 19: Rajoy and the Podemos threat 
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Rivera trying to present his party as a new alternative or some sort of a third way between PP and 
PSOE, this meme image suggests that in essence they are all the same. On top of that, Francoist 
legacy is depicted to be shadowing all three parties and perhaps the entire political system. The 
text at the bottom of the image says: “Vote for Rivera” and behind layers of posters a text that says 
“Vote for PSOE” seems to appear. 
When analyzing the big picture of Spanish meme imagery, Rivera often appears as Rajoy’s ally or 
associate of some sort and rarely as an adversary. Despite his campaign promises of opposing 
Rajoy’s intentions to continue as a Prime Minister, in July 2016 Rivera backpedaled and promised 
Rajoy the abstention of his party in the government investiture.289 Most of the PSOE deputies 
abstained as well, after the party leader Pedro Sánchez’s resignation. This incident probably 
reinforced such depictions of the relations of these parties. Interestingly, as Pablo Iglesias and 
Podemos have been the most uncompromising actors in opposition to Rajoy, the meme imagery 
largely lacks such portrayals of them and Rajoy. Their relation is generally portrayed as strongly 
antagonistic.  
In Spanish politics, Francoism is a theme that is often used as a weapon to defeat political enemies. 
Traditionally, Francoist dictatorship has been most closely connected to PP, due to its clear family 
and ideological roots in Francoism. The founder of PP’s predecessor (Alianza Popular), Manuel 
Fraga, was an ex-minister of Franco and many of its leaders are offspring of the Francoist political 
elites. Other parties have been trying to stress these links to Francoism, while PP has been trying 
to downplay them, as since the democratic transition, links to the dictatorship are perceived as a 
strong delegitimizing factor. Many Spanish meme images utilize the delegitimizing power of the 
dictatorship analogy, as they often draw parallels between Rajoy and Franco. The Francoist symbol 
serves a moralistic function as it equates the other camp with a violent dictator that was not only 
calamitous for Spanish democracy, but also responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of 
Spaniards.290 Van Dijk has recognized comparisons made to historical villains as an efficient 
rhetorical resource used to emphasize the undesirability of the “other”,291 which in this case is the 
political elite. 
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I see that such portrayal of these major parties could benefit the simultaneous populist rupture that 
was taking place in Spanish politics. From Laclauian theoretical perspective, I see these meme 
images as discursive acts of constructing an understanding of the Spanish political sphere, where 
despite campaign slogans and promises, Ciudadanos, PSOE and PP are positioned as part of the 
establishment, heirs of Francoism and, therefore, antagonistic to the people. In the active period of 
politicized struggle around 2015 and 2016 elections, Ciudadanos was also trying to draw at least 
two different frontiers; one between itself and the traditional two-party system, and another that 
would differentiate it from the ones that Ciudadanos would call populists or communists i.e. 
Podemos.292 These meme images seem to follow an antagonistic logic of equivalence, which 
according to Laclau and Mouffe looks to divide the society strictly in two camps, which “does not 
admit tertium quid”.293 Out of the four main parties, they seem to place Podemos outside the 
political establishment and on the side of “the people”. This discursive drawing of frontier was 
repeatedly made in Spanish meme imagery in 2015–2016.  
The message of this meme image seems to be in line with the early stance Podemos took regarding 
the other main parties. Early Podemos conceived all the main parties as antagonistic enemies of 
the people. Podemos, however, has been in the middle of an inner conflict over where to draw the 
political frontier. The struggle has been over whether to remain antagonistic towards the whole 
political establishment (including PSOE and PP) or just the conservative right wing of the 
establishment (most importantly PP). While the disagreement over strategy has caused a rupture 
inside the party (Íñigo Errejón’s resignation in 2019), in the last few years Podemos seems to have 
shifted to consider PP as its main organizational enemy. Due to the fact that overthrowing PP from 
power seemed impossible without entering into an alliance with PSOE, it transformed its relation 
with PSOE into an agonistic one and finally in January 2020 even formed a coalition government 
with the age old socialist party. According to Chantal Mouffe, an agonistic relation considers the 
other as a legitimate adversary with whom confrontation may and will occur, but always according 
to a shared set of rules and mutual acceptance of the legitimacy of each other’s right to be part of 
the political space. Antagonistic relation, on the other hand, does not view the other as a legitimate 
actor sharing the same political field.294  
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Figure 19 exemplifies the often-repeated understanding in the Rajoy-themed meme imagery, 
which suggests that the only actors truly challenging Rajoy and the establishment are Podemos 
and its leader Pablo Iglesias (often nicknamed el Coletas referring to his ponytail). In this meme 
image, Rajoy is photoshopped to appear in Alfred Hitchcock’s film North by Northwest, where 
Cary Grant plays Roger O. Thornhill, an innocent man who, after being mistaken for a spy, ends 
up in a cat and mouse game as he is pursued by secret agents and the police around the US. 
Throughout the film, the protagonist tries to make sense of what is going on. In this particular 
scene, Roger is chased by a crop-dusting plane operated by his pursuers. Roger is trying to avoid 
machine gun fire and pesticides that his pursuers are using to eliminate him.  
 In the meme image, Rajoy is fleeing from a ponytailed pilot flying a Podemos plane. As Rajoy 
became the symbolic object for memetic indignation over inequality and corruption, he is now 
chased by another symbol, one that signified popular sovereignty and resistance for much of the 
online community. The situation looks hopeless for Rajoy, who seems exhausted from running 
and swears: “Damn with el Coletas!” The threat of this pursuer seems to be drawing in irresistibly, 
which suggests an analogy to the fledgling Podemos, which at the time of the publication of the 
image on La Mosca Cojonera blog (December 2014), was increasing its popularity 
unprecedentedly. In fact, in the November 2014 polls, Podemos had already topped both PP and 
PSOE, despite being founded less than a year before.295 As the meme image suggests, Podemos’ 
surge seemed unstoppable and as wiping out Rajoy was high on their objective list, the position of 
this career politician seemed desperate.  
Rajoy is running for all he is worth as the populist challenge is closing in. A populist discourse 
oftentimes encourages a notion that the establishment politicians are frightened about their surge, 
since this would in their logic mean “the people” achieving political subjectivity. In this discourse, 
the political establishment is willingly described as being alienated from the people and only 
looking for their own narrow interests. This looks to strengthen the perception that the rivalry 
between the establishment parties is, in fact, only ostensible, and that the only real threat for them 
and the option on the side of the underprivileged, is the populist outsider. 
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5.4 Evil EU  
In the previous subchapters we saw how the populist online meme imagery attacked Rajoy and the 
Spanish political establishment. Like many other populist voices, Spanish meme images also found 
antagonists in the international organizations. The European Union was an evident antagonist for 
the populist mobilization as it was largely due to the pressure from the EU that forced the crisis 
economies to implement strict austerity measures. Rajoy is accused of not standing up to the EU 
and letting the people down as they were condemned to suffer the consequences. As we have seen 
before in this chapter (see for example Mariano Scissorhands meme) Rajoy is generally not 
portrayed as a mal-intended person, but rather he is making these horrible decisions because of his 
weakness, simple-mindedness or lack of judgement. With the following images I exemplify how 
Rajoy’s relations with the EU and especially Angela Merkel was represented.  
 
Figure 21: Rajoy and change Figure 20: Rajoy as Merkel’s puppet 
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As I pointed out earlier in this chapter, one prominent critique against the traditional parties was 
their consensus about the importance of the EU integration. In the figure 20, Rajoy is pictured as 
being merely a hand puppet of Angela Merkel, who seems to be working as an empty signifier in 
the Spanish populist meme material. The German Chancellor seems to signify occasionally the EU 
as an (oppressive) institution, just the austerity measures or an example of a determined politician 
defending the interests of her own country (something that meme imagery suggests Rajoy is not). 
By analyzing memes that I have collected about Mariano Rajoy, it is noteworthy that a number of 
them depict Rajoy as submissive party in the professional and political relationship with Merkel. 
In other meme images, Rajoy is also portrayed as submissive to the former Deputy Prime Minister 
Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría. This submissive role is often described in sexual terms, as 
exemplified in figure 22 with captions in Catalan language saying: “this is how Merkel will leave 
my butthole”, which suggests a penetration done by Merkel giving her the supposedly dominant, 
penetrating role in western heterosexual relationships.  
A list of unpopular austerity measures (such as raising VAT to 21%, leaving public workers 
without extra pay or diminishing the number of city councilors) reported in the meme image are 
alleged to be dictated by the German chancellor. Rajoy-puppet is also holding a bag with Bankia-
logo (one of the largest banks in Spain) on it, probably to suggest he is receiving bribes or to 
emphasize his role in using extensive amounts of money to rescue the banks while imposing 
austerity measures that heavily affected most Spaniards. Other common accusation along these 
lines was that Rajoy sold the country and its people for Germany and Angela Merkel. This 
Figure 22: Rajoy’s butt and Merkel 
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discourse was also used by Podemos in their attacks against Rajoy.296 The underlying idea with 
this image, as well as other memes in this chapter, seems to be that international institutions and 
corporate power have taken hold of the national politicians. What these images, alongside the 
Indignados-Movement and Podemos are trying to achieve, seems to be a shift in understanding 
towards seeing the political and economic elites as the main culprits for the economic crisis and 
the distress of the citizens.  
Figure 21 is again using scissors as a symbol of austerity measures, while Rajoy is shown to have 
a picture of Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, the President of the French Republic at the time, on his 
desk. Both leaders are pictured with their middle fingers up, perhaps giving the viewers (the 
Spaniards) the finger, while Rajoy is beginning his austerity measures. This reinforces the idea of 
the EU as a Franco-German project and the rest of the members acting as solely by-standers in 
decision-making. A picture of ex-Prime Minister of the People’s Party, José María Aznar, is 
hanging on the wall as well, possibly hinting that the former People’s Party leader is influencing 
Rajoy’s decisions. 
The scissor case is equipped with the slogan of the People’s Party’s 2011 campaign, “the change 
begins”, in which this meme image apparently sees a lot of irony. As these memes can be seen to 
advocate for a radical reformation of the political system, PP, as a conservative actor and the most 
prominent defender of the status quo, is seen as the main adversary. Therefore, its promises of 
change are held up to ridicule.  
Meme images and other populist voices have eagerly criticized the EU and especially the so-called 
Troika, which is a term used widely in the media to refer to the decision group of European 
Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund, for the worsened 
economic conditions that many citizens in crisis-struck countries had to face. Under economic 
decrees of the EU, politicians such as Rajoy and Zapatero had limited options in case of economic 
crisis. In 1997, the Stability and Growth Pact had limited the government deficit of the Eurozone 
countries to 3 per cent and government debt to 60% of the GDP, which basically ruled out 
Keynesian solutions for economic crises, since they are based on running deficits. Furthermore, 
devaluations (which Spain had done four times between 1992 and 1995) and tariffs to protect the 
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balance of payments were impossible under European Economic and Monetary Union. Hence, 
neoliberal economics were institutionalized in the system of the EU and the Eurozone.297 
In practice, EU-countries poorly followed the deficit and debt limitations, when even Germany 
and France broke the regulations, they had themselves insisted on. Nevertheless, guidelines for 
what economic policies in the EU should look like were laid down. This left very few plausible 
options for politicians to handle such crises and made them easy targets for different populist 
openings. Firstly, what Spanish politicians could do in such debt crisis was to convince the creditor 
countries (such as Germany and Finland) to bail out the debts. The second option was to leave the 
Eurozone and devaluate heavily the new currency. These options seemed to be out of question, 
simply because the popular opinion was widely against them. Third option was the austerity way, 
which in practice meant cuts in government spending and increase in taxation, which would lead 
to even higher unemployment and other social problems but would also potentially balance the 
deficit.298 The reaction of the Troika towards anti-austerity initiatives of Syriza in Greece provides 
us an example of how challenging neoliberal order was incompatible with EU membership and 
the Eurozone.299 As the Troika is not a prime example of a democratically elected and 
representative decision-making body, its actions provide an easy target for populist discourse 
demanding popular sovereignty over technocracy of the Troika and over those who publicly 
support it.  
By using the powerful rhetoric seen throughout this chapter, internet memes seem to be painting a 
bleak picture of the politics. They seem to propagate a perception of a crisis of popular sovereignty 
of the Spaniards. Rajoy and Zapatero are seen just as pawns and the true villains are the 
corporations, oligarchs, global markets and the EU, which memes seem to depict almost as 
colonizing powers. Democracy is in crisis when citizens are left with no choice for alternative 
political projects and their demands remain unmet. Their role as voters seems to be limited to 
approving “rational” measures outlined by experts and international undemocratic organizations. 
Disaffection with democratic institutions have risen and abstention has increased.300 The bulk of 
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the Spanish meme imagery analyzed in this study seems to share this understanding of the political 
situation and looks to challenge the hegemonic systems of signification.  
Looking back at Rajoy’s time as Prime Minister, it seems clear that the Spanish political system 
went through a rupture as various new parties made their way to the Spanish Parliament. During 
the economic downturn it became evident that Spanish political system was in, what Gramsci calls 
interregnum, a conjuncture, where “the old is dying and the new cannot be born”301. In case left 
without solution, such conjuncture can result in the kind of populist moment that occurred in Spain 
in the aftermath of the economic downturn that caused a crisis in the neoliberal hegemony.302 
Similarly to many other important changes in contemporary societies, the challenge to the old 
establishment was largely orchestrated on the internet. Social media platforms were important 
arenas for discussions over democracy, equality and corruption. Online communities propagated 
populist understandings of the elite that made the citizens go through strict austerity, while 
benefiting themselves via corruption and fraud. Mariano Rajoy became the symbol for these 
grievances and therefore ended up being a target for the memetic indignation.  
After witnessing the emergence of many anti-establishment parties in Western Europe, and while 
worrying about the strengthening of far-right ideas, Chantal Mouffe sees some hope in the current 
situation. She argues that the thirty years old neoliberal hegemonic formation has entered a crisis, 
which has provided an opportunity to establish a new hegemony, which can be more authoritarian 
or more democratic, depending on through which type of politics the challenge will be set. Mouffe, 
acknowledging her own partisanship, hopes this challenge to come from the progressive left, which 
should employ populist strategy and construct a political frontier between the people and the 
oligarchy.303 In most European countries, however, this challenge has so far surged strongly from 
the far-right. Spain provides us with one of the few exceptions with the emergence of the 
Indignados-movement and Podemos, which Paolo Gerbaudo sees as examples of what populism 
that is not xenophobic or authoritarian, but rather progressive, emancipatory and democratic, could 
look like.304 The populist moment in Spain, however, remains unsettled as with the 2019 electoral 
success of the far-right populist party Vox, the populists from left and right now have a strong 
 
301 Gramsci 1947, 311.  
302 Mouffe 2018, 13. 
303 Mouffe 2018, 45-47, Laclau 2005. 
304 Gerbaudo 2017, 9-10.  
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foothold in Spanish politics, while the old parties have also managed to hold on to a significant 
part of their past electorate. The cultural work done by the political memes in this chapter is an 
example through which means and discourses this confrontation between the people and the elite 
can be constructed. The meme imagery during Rajoy’s reign, seemed to align themselves with 
other voices that make a bottom-up reclamation for popular sovereignty or as the Spanish 
Indignados, they demand “Democracia real ya” (real democracy now) instead of a perceived 
flawed democracy.  
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5. Conclusions 
The starting point of this study was to analyze the ways, in which the former Spanish Prime 
Minister Mariano Rajoy is depicted in the online meme imagery. This allowed me to dig deeper 
and investigate what kinds of understandings of social realities these images propagate. I argued 
that much of the meme imagery commenting on Rajoy communicated populist notions and 
appeared to fix meanings to positions that were favorable to such political agenda. Memes 
portrayed Rajoy as the antagonist of “the people” and he came to symbolize a whole variety of 
grievances that Spanish online community felt towards the political establishment. Shared 
opposition to Rajoy and in the bigger picture to the whole political system, functioned as a glue to 
bring together these otherwise heterogeneous demands and grievances. These observations 
encouraged me to dig deeper into the theoretical discussion on populism and see how different 
approaches and insights could help us to understand populist communication on social media and, 
more precisely, in online meme imagery.  
In order to analyze digital culture artefacts, such as meme images that usually combine both image 
and text, I argued that the most comprehensive approach would include theoretical insights that 
help us to understand how populist identities are built through both verbal/textual as well as 
visual/aesthetic elements. In this study I drew on Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populism as a logic 
of articulation and complemented it with Benjamin Moffitt’s ideas of populism as a political style. 
By testing this theoretical framework with images representing Rajoy, I argued out that meme 
images constructed a populist subjectivity by articulating together differential social grievances 
around antagonism towards the establishment, which Rajoy became to symbolize. This was done 
through “the message” of the meme images, in other words through different understandings of 
social realities these images propagated.305 However, as Moffitt argues, “populism as a political 
style fuses matter and manner, message and package”306, I also wanted to highlight the importance 
of “the package”, i.e. the aesthetic and stylistic choices in the meme imagery. I argue that these 
elements carry meanings as well.  
Stylistically meme images reflected Moffitt’s ideas in many ways. Meme images appealed to the 
people through “bad manners” or “performances of ordinariness” by emphasizing their amateurish 
 
305 Laclau 2005.  
306 Moffitt 2016, 28–50.  
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grassroots background with their stylistic choices described as “internet ugly aesthetics” and by 
making visual references to “the people”, neglected by the elite. Meme cultures also despise the 
formality and seriousness of official politics and mainstream media outlets. Through 
aforementioned stylistic choices, the online meme cultures draw frontiers between themselves and 
the elites. 
Moffitt emphasized populist leaders as the main performers of populism, but I argued that his 
insights would be useful in analyzing signifying acts made by other actors as well. Populist 
meaning-making is not limited to the leaders of the movements or parties, but as Niko Hatakka 
argues, it is, indeed, made by various different actors that claim or are perceived to represent the 
populist collective subject, “the people”.307 Online negotiations have a significant impact on the 
formation of populist identities and meme images are important popular culture items used in this 
communication. Therefore, I went on to combine theoretical literature of political science on 
populism with the cultural studies’ underlying understanding of popular culture as a site, where 
power relations are established or unsettled, and identities are articulated or reconfigured.  
As we do not have definitive knowledge about the underlying intentions or meanings that people 
crafting and sharing these digital items try to transmit, this study focused on different meanings 
the viewers can possibly give to them. This gives us an opportunity to analyze what kind of social 
understandings these images construct. To perform this task, it is imperative to understand the 
social context, where these images operate. Rajoy’s era on the top of the Spanish politics saw 
increasing economic difficulties and significant anti-establishment mobilizations, first in the 
Indignados, and later in the form of the populist left party Podemos. The key demands of these 
movements, which revolved around fixing the broken democracy as well as ending austerity and 
corruption, stood out in the meme material as well.  
Corruption and hypocrisy were discussed in the chapter 4. In these meme images, Rajoy was 
pictured as a disingenuous and, at times, even evil politician. I suggested that such depictions could 
be analyzed as a part of a populist project. We might argue that, for instance, a meme image 
portraying Rajoy as a corrupt politician that basically steals taxpayers’ money, is not per se 
populist (or non-populist for that matter). Articulating such understanding of Rajoy in a time where 
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public spending was significantly cut down and taxes increased to balance the budget, could 
however work in favor of populism, in which antagonism against the political elites is crucial. 
Meme images do not function in isolation. They rather work in close relation with other signifying 
acts, forming a large communicational mosaic that, piece by piece, propagates certain 
understandings of the world and potentially constitutes a political subjectivity around it. In this 
chapter, we also saw an example of how revealing hypocrisy and fabrication was used as an 
efficient strategy to reject anti-populist de-articulation attempts made by the PP campaign.  
The Spanish Indignados demanded “real democracy now” and, accordingly, real alternatives for 
austerity measures and other neoliberal policies. In chapter 5, I analyzed how these grievances 
were communicated in the meme material. Memes did not only paint a picture of an economic 
crisis but portrayed a crisis of democracy as the system was not offering any electoral alternatives 
for austerity. These images also articulated together differential grievances, while pointing fingers 
at Rajoy and the system. Additionally, some images articulated PP, PSOE and Ciudadanos as the 
Francoist establishment, while others advocated Podemos as the anti-establishment force to 
reclaim the sovereignty of “the people”. In other words, these images participated in building a 
populist identity by unifying differential demands and presenting the political establishment as a 
culprit for neglecting the needs of these citizens. Spanish meme imagery also pictured the EU as 
another threat to the popular sovereignty, as Rajoy was depicted as having sold Spain for the EU 
or as being a mere puppet of the German chancellor Angela Merkel herself.  
Despite their humoristic tone, the meme images in the chapters 4 and 5 participate in a serious 
discussion of what has gone wrong in Spanish politics. We can recognize discourses such as 
politicians being disingenuous or sheer thieves that empty proper taxpayers’ pockets, and that 
nothing is really being done to tackle corruption since the legislative power is in the hands of the 
parties themselves. As both traditional parties have an excessive record of widespread corruption 
cases, the situation was not seen as likely to change. The situation had evolved to a de facto 
particracy. Another common discourse seemed to be that the traditional parties were in fact the 
same and that voting as an activity had become futile, or as Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias put it, 
it was like choosing between Coca Cola and Pepsi. As illustrated in the chapter 5, this problem 
was underlined by the fact that both Rajoy and the previous PSOE Prime Minister Zapatero agreed 
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on strict austerity measures dictated by the EU and the so-called Troika, so there was no real 
options for voters who did not support the austerity measures.  
When looking at the bigger picture, all of these depictions seem to lead to one conclusion – the 
system is broken. The political elite is alienated from “the people” it is supposed to represent, as 
it benefits from their money with impunity and unanimously imposes them austerity. The trust in 
democratic decision-making had collapsed and meme images joined in the Spanish Indignados’ 
chant: “We have a vote, but we do not have a voice”. The underlying tone is normative: the control 
is now in the hands of the corrupted political elites, oligarchs and supranational organizations, but 
ought to be reclaimed by “the people”. In this situation, where the establishment was, in fact, 
unable to satisfy the needs and demands of large parts of the population, the populist actors made 
great efforts to highlight and spectacularize these failures in order to paint a picture of a severe 
crisis or breakdown. This sense of crisis is crucial for populism to be able to articulate different 
grievances into what it would present as “the will of the people”. Along the lines of the Indignados, 
some meme images seemed to advocate Pablo Iglesias as the torch-bearer that would carry “the 
will of the people” to the decision-making arenas, while some seemed to opt out from institutional 
politics inside the system that they perceived terminally ill. The different forms of resistance 
managed to cause a significant rupture in the Spanish political system and the political spectrum 
saw, in fact, quite a dramatic change during Rajoy’s time in office (2011–2018) with the 
emergence of various new political parties. Based on the results from general elections in recent 
years, the support for the two traditional parties (PP and PSOE) has permanently fallen under 50 
percent, despite being over 80 percent in 2008.  
Despite the emphasis of this study on meme material related to more serious social critique, much 
of the meme imagery focused on light-hearted buffoonery around Rajoy’s external attributes, such 
as his comical facial expressions, clumsy postures, public gaffes, mistakes in speeches and 
unintended lisp. Much like many populist politicians, online meme imagery is characterized by 
“bad manners” or lack of political formality, as everything or anything can be laughed at. However 
serious some of their accusations might be, most meme imagery still seems to value a good laugh 
over deliberate criticism. As politics becomes increasingly mediated and performed, the qualities 
related to aesthetics, style and likeability are not of secondary importance.  
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In this study, I analyzed how populism is communicated in online meme imagery. Meme images 
do not often demonstrate explicit partisanship or endorse some specific politician. However, when 
they do, that is more often than not, the populist over establishment politician. While understanding 
the reasons behind this alliance was not the main purpose of this study, I have pointed out similar 
characteristics between many populist politicians and the online meme cultures such as cynicism 
towards elite-lead institutions, rejection of political formality and tendency towards humoristic 
self-expression. One reason for the internet to be such a fruitful platform for populist 
communication is that its algorithms arguably connect people with similar positions and 
grievances. The most obvious factor for the online endorsement for populism is its emphasis on 
the grassroots, a promise to make the voice of the people heard, which signals a sense of 
horizontality. To get closer to their online supporters, some parties, such as Podemos, have even 
established themselves as “digital parties” by adopting online participatory platforms to permit 
grassroots deliberation and decision-making.308 Research has also shown that online grassroots 
negotiations affect what ideological elements populist movements end up articulating.309 Many 
populist leaders themselves prefer communicating with their supporters through social media 
channels as they frame this as circumventing the biased establishment media and addressing “the 
people” directly.310 This communication often takes a less formal or humoristic form. Humor can 
make communication more ambiguous and therefore leave the message open for various different 
interpretations, which may help in convincing and unifying the crowd, whose demands and needs 
are manifold.  
As I am writing these conclusions in spring 2020, a Facebook meme group of 200 000 members 
officially endorsed a populist candidate (Bernie Sanders) running in the United States presidential 
primaries. Correspondingly, other highly visible candidate, billionaire Michael Bloomberg, was 
reported hiring online activists to craft memes for his campaign. It seems clear that online meme 
culture is now a battleground for political debate. Memes have become some of the most easily 
transmittable tools available and therefore have inevitably become a key format for regular users 
to unite around specific issues, frame media conversations to suit their goals and generate talking 
points. Given the importance of this arena for any contemporary political struggle, future research 
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should ask why online activism and meme imagery seems to ridicule some politicians and endorse 
others. Despite few recent important advances on this field,311 the symbiotic union between 
populism and social media should be put under increasing academic scrutiny.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
311 See: Krämer 2017; Hatakka 2019.  
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